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ABSTRACT  
Using US bank holding company data for the period 2001 to 2007, this paper examines 
the relationship between banks' retained interests in securitisations and insolvency risk. We 
find that the provision of credit enhancements and guarantees significantly increases bank 
insolvency risk, albeit this varies for different levels of securitisation outstanding. 
Specifically, retained interests increase insolvency risk for “large-scale” securitisers while 
having a risk-reducing effect for “small-scale” and/or first-time securitisers. In addition, we 
find that the type of facility provided has implications for bank risk, with those with the most 
subordinated (first-loss) position having the greater impact on banks' default risk. Finally, we 
find that engagement in third-party securitisations has no significant effect on bank risk.  
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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 
The process of securitisation is composed of three main steps: (i) the pooling of assets; 
(ii) the creation of a special purpose vehicle (SPV) and the transfer of the asset pool to the 
SPV; and (iii) the structuring of the transaction. The latter involves the provision of credit 
enhancements and guarantees to protect investors from potential losses on the securitised 
assets. These may take different forms and can be provided internally, externally, or a 
combination of both. The practice of providing internal credit enhancements to securitisation 
structures resulted in banks retaining on their balance sheets the risks of their off-balance 
sheet securitised assets. As a consequence, in the run up to the 2007-2009 financial crisis, 
many securitisation transactions created imperfect credit risk transfers, leading to risks being 
concentrated in the banking system rather than passed on to investors.  
Post crisis, national and international regulators have proposed a number of rules aiming 
to address the shortcomings of the securitisation markets. A key issue that regulators are 
trying to address relates to the alignment of incentives associated with securitisation. This 
resulted in the introduction of "risk retention rules" that require banks to maintain an interest 
in their own securitisations, based on the assumption that retaining “skin in the game” induces 
banks to improve screening and monitoring of borrowers. Examples of the proposed rules 
requiring securitisers to retain a portion of the credit risk in the assets that they securitise 
include Article 122a of the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD II) in the EU and Section 
941 of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act in the US. 
Notwithstanding their potential to minimise asymmetric information problems and 
foster a better alignment of incentives, retained interests also expose banks to the risk of their 
securitised assets. It is then somewhat surprising, given the mandatory risk retention proposed 
by the aforementioned policy recommendations, that no research to date has analysed 
empirically the implications of retained interests on bank insolvency risk. In addition, despite 
the relevance attached by policy makers to the structure of acceptable forms of risk retention, 
there is no empirical evidence, as far as we are aware, to evaluate whether the effects of 
retained interests are comparable across different forms of retention. 
Against this background, this paper makes three contributions to previous literature. 
First, using US bank holding company data for 2001-2007, we analyse the relationship 
between the total economic interests retained by banks in off-balance sheet securitisations and 
insolvency risk, measured as distance to default. Second, we investigate whether various 
forms of retained interests have a differential impact on bank risk. Finally, we consider the 
impact of the provision of enhancements and guarantees to third-party securitisations on bank 
risk. 
We find that total retained interests and guarantees offered to own securitisation 
structures significantly increase bank insolvency risk, albeit this varies for different levels of 
securitisation outstanding. Specifically, our evidence suggests that for “large-scale” 
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securitisers retained interests increase overall risk, while having a risk-reducing effect for 
“small-scale” and/or first-time securitisers. In addition, we find that the type of facility 
provided, as well as the possible interaction among different facilities, have implications for 
bank risk. Specifically, the risk-increasing effect appears to be driven mainly by the 
subordinated structure of facilities, with those with most subordinated (first-loss) position 
having greater impact on banks' risk of default. In addition, we find that credit enhancements 
tend to increase bank risk whereas liquidity provisions do not. Finally, we find that 
engagement in third-party securitisations through providing credit and/or liquidity support 
does not have significant effect on the risk of the banks.  
The results of this study have relevance to on-going policy developments, including the 
recent proposals by the Financial Stability Board and by the International Organisation of 
Securities Commissions (FSB 2012, IOSCO 2012). Specifically, while there have been calls 
for a standardised risk retention rule applied homogeneously across securitisations, we argue 
that there are fundamental factors that should be taken into account when designing the risk 
retention framework and that the perceived benefits of risk retention should be balanced with 
the potential costs. The proposed rules currently allow for some variation in the amount of 
risk that banks may retain, on the basis of the quality and characteristics of the assets 
securitised and on the economic environment at the time of securitisation. Our results, 
however, indicate that it is necessary to consider also the type of retained interests and the 
strategy of securitisers (that is, “small-scale” versus “large-scale”) when structuring the 
amount of risk to be retained for a particular securitisation. In other words, when designing 
the risk retention framework for securitisation, regulators should also consider bank risk at the 
institutional level, with a view to balancing the incentive structure embedded in interest 
retention with the use of securitisation as a tool to manage credit risk. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The development of securitisation over the past three decades has modified the 
functioning of banks from a traditional “originate-to-hold” to an “originate-to-distribute” 
model, which increased the reliance of financial intermediaries on capital markets as a source 
of finance. After an extended period of growth, global securitisation markets collapsed in 
2008, as the financial crisis exposed the problems inherent in the securitisation process 
(including misaligned incentives of participants and informational asymmetries). Evidence 
suggests that banks used increasingly complex securitisation structures that ultimately 
resulted in little credit risk transfer (Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez 2012).  
Conventional securitisation comprises three main steps. The first step is the pooling of 
assets. The second step involves the creation of a special purpose vehicle (SPV) and the 
transfer of the asset pool to the SPV. The third step is the structuring of the transaction. When 
structuring the transaction, the key stage is the provision of credit enhancements and 
guarantees to protect investors from potential losses on the securitised assets. Credit 
enhancements represent contractual arrangements in which a bank retains or assumes 
securitisation exposure and, in substance, provides some degree of added protection to other 
parties in the transaction (BCBS 2002). These enhancements may take different forms and 
can be provided internally, externally, or by a combination of both.1 Internal credit 
enhancements and guarantees (also known as retained interests) can be generated by the cash 
flows from the underlying assets (excess spread), by the structure of the transaction 
(subordinated securities), or can be provided by the originating bank (liquidity provisions, 
seller’s interest, and stand-by letters of credit). External (or third-party) credit enhancements 
include the credit support provided to other institutions’ securitisation structures and may take 
the form of a third-party letter of credit, cash collateral account, and surety bonds.2 
Credit enhancements are present in all securitisation transactions. The type and the 
amount of credit enhancements necessary to achieve a specific credit rating for the resulting 
asset-backed securities are normally determined by rating agencies and underwriters when 
structuring the transaction, and are based on the expected performance of the underlying pool 
of assets (Ashcraft and Schuermann 2008). Credit enhancements are also used to maintain the 
assigned rating levels and therefore can vary during the lifetime of a structured transaction.3 
Recent figures indicate an upward trend in the use of credit enhancements: total enhancements 
provided by US bank holding companies, including both those provided to own and to third-
party securitisations, increased from $25 billion in 2001, Quarter 2, to $70 billion in 2009, 
Quarter 1 (Mandel, Morgan, and Wei 2012). 
                                                 
1 The seller/originator may also provide non-contractual internal credit enhancements, which can be defined as 
credit support beyond the originator’s contractual obligations. This is commonly referred to as “implicit 
recourse”, and is a particular problem normally associated with the securitisation of revolving assets, such as for 
example, credit card receivables. The existence of implicit recourse is difficult to measure. 
2 Ashcraft and Schuermann (2008) provide a detailed discussion of the structural features of securitisation.  
3 See, for example, the case of an increase in credit enhancement for outstanding notes at JPMorgan Chase in 
2009: http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/05/12/idUS260368+12-May-2009+BW20090512. 
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The growth in the provision of credit enhancements raises the question of the role of 
retained interests in the securitisation process and ultimately their resultant effect on bank 
risk. It has long been common practice for securitisers to retain an economic interest in their 
own securitisation structures, which in theory should result in a better alignment of interests 
with investors in asset-backed securities (Pennacchi 1988, Gorton and Pennacchi 1995). Post 
crisis, the alignment of incentives in securitisation is of crucial importance for both regulators 
and industry standard-setters. Indeed, recent policy recommendations require banks to retain 
an interest in securitisations therefore relying on the assumption that having an originator to 
retain a long-term economic exposure (the so called “skin in the game”) can better align 
interests between originators and investors and incentivise the former to originate high quality 
assets (BIS 2011, Geithner 2011).4 In other words, retained interests should, in theory, induce 
better underwriting standards and increase banks’ incentives to screen and monitor borrowers, 
and thereby lower overall bank risk.  
Notwithstanding their potential to minimise asymmetric information problems and 
foster a better alignment of incentives between banks and investors, retained interests also 
expose banks to the risk of the securitised assets. In addition, given the lower capital 
requirements associated with retained interests, the structuring of transactions created a 
significant concentration of risks, thereby increasing banks' insolvency risk (Shin 2009, 
Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez 2012). In many cases, the simple act of securitising loans 
decreased a bank’s capital requirements substantially.5 The fact that the risk inherent to 
securitised assets was not passed on to investors but remained on banks' balance sheets, in the 
form of retained interests and guarantees, is considered one of the key reasons for the severity 
of the financial crisis (Shin 2009). 
Post crisis, a key issue for regulators has been the introduction of "risk retention rules" 
that require banks to maintain an interest in their own securitisations.6 These rules are based 
on the assumption that retaining "skin in the game" induces banks to improve screening and 
monitoring of borrowers. However, the potential benefits of risk retention do not come 
without costs. There is a general consensus in the literature that the retention of economic 
interests in securitisation may result in the risk to remain with the originating bank (Calomiris 
and Mason 2004, Gorton and Souleles 2006, Niu and Richardson 2006, Shin 2009). It is then 
                                                 
4 The G20 Leaders’ statement of the Pittsburgh Summit (September 2009) recommended that securitisers should 
retain a part of the risk of the underlying assets. This measure intends to correct the misalignment of incentives 
and encourage originators to apply rigorous lending policies (BIS 2011). This guideline has already been 
included within some regulations, including Section 941 of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act in the US and Article 122a 
of the 2011 Capital Requirements Directive (CRD II) in the EU.  
5 A key issue that surfaced during the financial crisis relates to the fact that securitisation allowed banks to 
reduce their capital reserves without reducing their risk exposure. A bank could securitise a loan and keep all the 
resulting securities on its own balance sheet still achieving a reduction in its capital requirements without having 
effectively reduced risk. This was because the risk weight attached to more senior tranches was lower than those 
attached to the original loan (for example, 50% for a loan versus 20% for AAA and AA tranches). See for 
example, Goldman Sachs (2009), Erel, Nadauld, and Stulz (2012). 
6 For example, in the EU, Article 122a of the Capital Requirements Directive. In the US, Section 941 of the 
Dodd-Frank Act requires securitisers to retain a material portion (generally 5 percent) of credit risk of securitised 
exposures and prohibits the originator or the sponsor from directly or indirectly hedging or otherwise transferring 
this risk. 
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somewhat surprising, given the mandatory risk retention proposed by recent policy 
recommendations, that no research to date has analysed empirically the implications of 
retained interests on bank insolvency risk. In addition, despite the relevance attached by 
policy makers to the structure of acceptable forms of risk retention, there is no empirical 
evidence, as far as we are aware, to evaluate whether the effects of retained interests are 
comparable across different forms of retention.7  
It is against this background that this study examines the relationship between banks’ 
retained interests in securitisations and insolvency risk. Using US bank holding company data 
for 2001-2007, we make three contributions to the literature. First, we analyse the relationship 
between the total economic interests retained by banks in off-balance sheet securitisations and 
insolvency risk. Second, we investigate whether various forms of retained interests have a 
differential impact on bank risk. Finally, we consider banks' engagement in third-party 
securitisations. 
More specifically, we analyse the relationship between bank retained interests and 
insolvency risk, measured as distance to default (via a z-score measure). Subsequently, we 
investigate whether various forms of retained interests have a differential impact on bank risk, 
with differences potentially arising from the type and/or subordination of underlying facilities. 
Specifically, we consider the following forms of retained interests: (i) credit enhancements, 
including credit-enhancing interest-only strips (excess spread between the interest generated 
by the underlying pool of assets and that on the issued securities backed by the pool); 
subordinated securities (tranches of asset-backed securities); and standby letters of credit 
(unfunded commitment that guarantees limited protection against losses on the underlying 
assets); (ii) liquidity support (a commitment to provide funding to the securitisation to ensure 
investors of timely payments on asset-backed securities); and (iii) seller's interest (the 
difference between the total amount of assets included in the securitisation and the amount of 
assets underlying issued securities, also known as over-collateralisation). Finally, we consider 
the impact of the provision of credit enhancements and guarantees to third-party 
securitisations on bank risk. 
 Our results provide evidence of a negative and significant impact of retained interests 
on bank insolvency risk. These results are consistent across several model specifications. A 
key issue that arises when attempting to estimate the impact of retained interests on bank 
insolvency risk is the potential endogeneity bias that may result from reverse causality. That 
is, the level of retained interests may be driven by the risk of the originating bank. To address 
this concern, we implement an instrumental variable (IV) technique. Our baseline finding of a 
significant and negative effect of retained interests on insolvency risk holds in the IV analysis. 
This therefore suggests that endogeneity of the securitisation decision does not drive our main 
results. 
                                                 
7 The acceptable forms of risk retention include: (i) a vertical slice (where a securitiser retains a pro rata piece of 
every tranche in the securitisation); (ii) a horizontal slice (where a securitiser retains a first-loss interest in the 
securitisation structure); and (iii) a representative sample (where a securitiser retains a randomly selected subset 
of assets representing the securitised pool in terms of credit risk) (Geithner 2011). 
7 
 
An investigation of different forms of retained interests reveals that credit enhancements 
and seller’s interest have a risk-increasing effect, while the provision of liquidity does not 
seem to affect bank risk. We tentatively explain this result with reference to the intrinsic 
nature of liquidity support to posit that liquidity provisions are, in general, excess funds 
provided by the originator to the SPV as a buffer, so the first loss is absorbed by the SPV.  
The data allow us to analyse the effect of credit enhancements in more detail by 
decomposing them according to the underlying facility. The results show that credit-
enhancing interest-only strips have the strongest risk-increasing effect, consistently with their 
subordinated (first-loss) position, followed by standby letters of credit. On the other hand, 
subordinated securities do not seem to impact bank risk. This is a particularly interesting 
result, as it offers some support to the theoretical literature on the mitigating effect on bank 
risk taking of holding a subordinated/equity tranche. Further, we find that engagement in 
third-party securitisations does not have significant effect on bank risk.  
An investigation of the risk effects of retained interests for different levels of 
securitisation outstanding reveals a risk-reducing effect for banks with a low securitisation 
activity, and a risk-increasing effect for banks with a high securitisation activity. This 
evidence suggests that for “small-scale” securitisers and/or first-time securitisers the “skin in 
the game” improves incentives to originate high quality assets and therefore reduces the 
overall risk. For “large-scale” securitisers, retained interests seem to serve mainly as a buffer 
against the default risk of the collateral therefore increasing bank risk.  
Overall, the findings presented in this study have a direct relevance for on-going policy 
developments. Specifically, while a standardised risk retention rule applied homogeneously 
across securitisations may allow for “greater transparency, measurability, and certainty of 
implementation” (Geithner 2011), we argue that there are fundamental factors that should be 
taken into account when structuring the risk retention framework. The proposed rules do 
allow for some variation in the amount of risk that banks may retain, on the basis of the 
quality and characteristics of the assets securitised and on the economic environment at the 
time of securitisation. Our results, however, seem to indicate that it is necessary to consider 
also the type of retained interests and the strategy of securitisers (that is, “small-scale” versus 
“large-scale”) when structuring the amount of risk that should be retained for a particular 
securitisation. In other words, our results suggest that, when designing the risk retention 
framework for securitisation, regulators should also consider the bank risk perspective with a 
view to balance the incentive structure embedded in interest retention with the use of 
securitisation as a tool to manage credit risk. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2  discusses the role of 
interest retention in securitisation and reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 describes the 
data selection and sample specification. The empirical specification is presented in Section 4, 
while Section 5 reports the results of the main empirical analyses. Section 6 describes the 
robustness tests and Section 7 discusses the findings and concludes the paper. 
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2 THE ROLE OF RETAINED INTERESTS IN SECURITISATION  
The existence of retained interests in securitisation raises three crucial questions: Why 
do banks retain an economic interest in securitisations? How much to retain? What are the 
risk implications of different retention mechanisms? These questions are central to both the 
current academic and policy debates on the future of securitisation markets and are key to our 
empirical investigation. Below we review the extant literature and detail how our analysis 
contributes to the understanding of these issues. 
2.1 Why Do Banks Retain an Economic Interest in Securitisations?  
The literature puts forward a number of key factors driving risk retention: information 
asymmetries, signalling, liquidity creation, and regulatory arbitrage. Below we briefly review 
this literature.  
A. Information Asymmetries 
The process of securitisation raises issues of information asymmetries and misaligned 
incentives between the banks and the final investors in asset-backed securities. Banks have 
private information on the quality of the loans they securitise. As investors do not observe this 
information, they may require a “lemon discount” which can drive the price of the resulting 
securities below their book value. This results from the fact that the incentive structure of 
securitisation can create adverse selection (low quality loans are securitised) and moral hazard 
problems (as loans can be sold, lenders lack incentives to screen and monitor borrowers).  
 The asymmetric information problem may constrain a bank's ability to securitise loans. 
As a consequence, in order to attract investors to buy asset-backed securities, banks must be 
able to offer explicit and/or implicit contractual design features that help mitigate adverse 
selection and moral hazard (Pennacchi 1988). Gorton and Pennacchi (1995) consider two 
possible features of bank loan sales which could reduce the asymmetric information problem: 
(i) offering an implicit guarantee on the value of the loan, and (ii) retaining a portion of the 
loan on the bank’s balance sheet. The authors argue that in these cases a bank retains some of 
the default risk of the loans and therefore there still remains an incentive for the bank to 
screen and monitor borrowers.  
Gorton and Souleles (2006) show that an originator’s ability to finance off-balance 
sheet via the debt of an SPV critically depends on the implicit guarantee contract between the 
originator and investors. Consistent with this, Landsman, Peasnell, and Shakespeare (2008) 
show that markets view securitisation transactions by originating firms with relatively low 
retained interests as sales (that is, risk transfer has taken place), whereas asset securitisations 
with high retained interests are viewed as secured borrowings (that is, risk transfer is 
incomplete). 
Fender and Mitchell (2009) examine the power of different contractual mechanisms to 
influence an originator’s effort to screen borrowers when the originator plans to securitise the 
loans. Analysing three potential retention mechanisms (holding an equity tranche, a 
mezzanine tranche, or a “vertical” slice of the portfolio), they find that the screening effort 
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varies across the arrangements depending on their sensitivities to systemic risk factors. 
Specifically, they find that the equity tranche may be dominated by either a vertical slice or 
by a mezzanine slice if a downturn is likely, and if the equity tranche is likely to be exhausted 
in a downturn. On the other hand, a vertical slice is unlikely to dominate both the equity 
tranche and the mezzanine tranche, unless it is very "thick". 
B. Signalling 
A variant of the asymmetric information hypothesis is the idea that banks that are 
securitising high quality assets use retention mechanisms to “signal” the quality of the assets 
being securitised. In this case, the signalling should imply a positive relationship between the 
level of retained interest and the performance of the securitised assets (Mandel, Morgan, and 
Wei 2012). This strand of the theory builds upon the theoretical literature on the role of 
collateral in bank lending (Besanko and Thakor 1987, Manove, Padilla, and Pagano 2001, 
Inderst and Mueller 2007). However, the empirical evidence seems to contradict the 
signalling motive and finds that riskier borrowers pledge more collateral and that 
collateralised loans are more likely to default ex-post (Berger and Udell 1990, 1995, Dennis, 
Nandy, and Sharpe 2000, Jiménez and Saurina 2004, Jiménez, Salas, and Saurina 2006).  
A number of recent studies have considered the hypothesis that retained interests are a 
signalling mechanism used to partially solve asymmetric information problems when 
structuring securitisation transactions. Albertazzi et al. (2011) find evidence to suggest that 
banks can effectively overcome, or at least mitigate, the negative effects of asymmetric 
information by retaining the most junior (equity) tranche as a signalling device of 
(unobservable) quality of the securitised portfolio or to express a commitment to keep 
monitoring borrowers. Downing, Jaffee, and Wallace (2009) also provide evidence of 
asymmetric information playing an important role in the functioning of the securitisation 
markets.  
Demiroglu and James (2012) examine the relationship between risk retention and the 
ex-post performance of mortgage-backed securities. Their results seem to suggest that 
retaining an interest in securitisation is significantly related to ex-post loan performance and 
that performance is better when the originator retains “skin in the game”. The positive 
relationship between performance and “skin in the game” is however confined to low 
documentation mortgages or deals that principally contain these mortgages. 
Erel, Nadauld, and Stulz (2012) focus on the holdings of highly-rated tranches of US 
banks and identify a number of possible determinants: (i) signalling (which they define as 
“securitisation business by-product”); (ii) regulatory arbitrage; (iii) bad incentives; (iv) risk 
management failure; (v) good deals; and (vi) too-big-to-fail. In their study, the securitisation 
business by-product hypothesis aims to test whether holding tranches of originated 
securitisation deals serves as a credible signal of deal quality to potential investors. As such, 
the expectation is that banks that are active in securitisation hold a larger amount of highly-
rated tranches as a fraction of their assets. Consistent with this hypothesis, they find that 
banks that were active in securitisation held larger amounts of highly-rated tranches, as a 
fraction of total assets, than other banks. 
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C. Liquidity 
Another reason for risk retention has been suggested by Dang, Gorton, and Holmström 
(2012), who argue that the purpose of securitisation is to create information-insensitive 
securities, which are defined as securities that are immune from adverse selection when 
trading (that is, the values of these securities do not depend on the information known only to 
informed agents). This property makes the information-insensitive security liquid. The idea is 
that, by offering credit enhancements, the originator can de-link the ex-ante credit risk of the 
asset pool and therefore issue securities that are independent from the credit risk of the 
collateral. The incentive for structuring transactions with credit enhancements and other 
contractual retained interests is thus to ensure the liquidity of the securities. 
Pagano and Volpin (2012) investigate whether originators face a conflict between 
expanding the placement of complex financial instruments and preserving the transparency 
and liquidity of their secondary markets. This conflict exists and creates an incentive for 
originators to negotiate with credit rating agencies a low level of transparency, that is, 
relatively coarse and uninformative ratings. In line with the model of Dang, Gorton, and 
Holmström (2012), Pagano and Volpin suggest that the elimination of some price-relevant 
information is functional to enhanced liquidity in the asset-backed securities new issue 
market. However, they also show that the opaqueness at the issue stage comes at the cost of a 
less liquid or even totally frozen secondary market and of a sharper price decline in case of 
default.  
D. Regulatory Arbitrage 
Finally, the provision of contractual guarantees to securitisations may allow banks to 
reduce their economic capital while maintaining a stable regulatory capital ratio. Under the 
Basle Accords, capital requirement for holdings of highly rated tranches were less onerous 
than those for the underlying assets. In terms of minimising capital requirements, banks were 
better off to securitise loans and to hold the resulting securities on their books, or even better 
in their off-balance sheet structures (Erel, Nadauld, and Stulz 2012). It is often argued that 
banks used the more advantageous capital requirements for the purpose of regulatory 
arbitrage. 
A recent study by Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2012) shows that the structure of risk 
sharing in asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) conduits implied recourse back to banks’ 
balance sheets. They find that banks used conduits to securitise assets without transferring 
credit risk and explain the results as evidence of regulatory capital arbitrage. However, Erel, 
Nadauld, and Stulz (2012) find no evidence in support of the regulatory capital arbitrage 
hypothesis. In particular, they find no evidence that banks with ABCP programmes held more 
highly-rated tranches.  
2.2 How much to Retain?  
A key factor driving the choice of the type and amount of guarantees provided in 
securitisations are cost considerations. External credit enhancements and guarantees are more 
costly in terms of up-front fees, normally have limits on the exposure, and are typically used 
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after the internally provided guarantees have been exhausted. The characteristics of the loans 
securitised, the amount of guarantees required to achieve a higher credit rating, as well as the 
cost of such guarantees, all play a role in the structuring of the transaction and may give banks 
incentives to provide internal credit enhancements. In other words, banks may retain a larger 
amount of contractual interests if the assets securitised are more opaque, if the assets are 
riskier, and if the cost of obtaining external guarantees is ex-ante higher.  
A study by Chen, Liu, and Ryan (2008) provides evidence that certain general 
characteristics of banks’ loan securitisations determine the extent to which banks retain risks 
in connection to their off-balance sheet securitised assets. The authors find that banks retain 
more risk when: (i) the types of loans have higher and/or less externally verifiable credit risk; 
(ii) the loans are closed-ended and banks retain larger contractual interests in the loans; and 
(iii) the loans are closed-ended and banks retain types of contractual interests that more 
strongly concentrate the risk of the securitised loans. These results are consistent with Park 
(2011), who shows that credit enhancement mechanisms, including tranching, reflect the risk 
of the underlying portfolio.  
2.3 What are the Risk Implications of Different Retention Mechanisms?  
The priority of claims is an important feature of structured transactions, although the 
mechanisms of interest subordination are somewhat opaque and ad-hoc in complex structures. 
Given the subordinated structure of credit-enhancing mechanisms, different arrangements 
may have different implications for bank overall risk. In addition, the interaction between 
different forms of support may increase the complexity of the relationship. While there is a 
general consensus in the literature that retention of a subordinated piece or a level of recourse 
close to the expected level of loss essentially results in all of the economic risk to remain with 
the intermediary (Calomiris and Mason 2004, Niu and Richardson 2006, Shin 2009), to date 
there is little empirical evidence on the effects of different forms of interest retention on bank 
insolvency risk, as well as possible interactions among them. Recent research examines the 
power of different contractual mechanisms on an originator’s screening effort and concludes 
that equity tranche retention might not always be the most effective arrangement (Fender and 
Mitchell 2009). However, attention has focused mainly on tranching and has largely ignored 
other commitment mechanisms. This is surprising, given that the recent policy 
recommendations impose mandatory risk retention in securitisation as well as a “menu” of 
acceptable forms of risk retention.  
 
From this review of the recent literature it is clear that key questions are still 
unanswered. This study contributes to the current academic and policy debates and provides 
an analysis of the relationship between interests retained by banks in their off-balance sheet 
securitisations and insolvency risk. In addition, we complement the recent literature by 
considering a wide range of contractual risk retention mechanisms, including credit 
enhancements and liquidity provisions, as well as credit and liquidity support provided to 
other institutions’ securitisation structures. Proper alignment of incentives in securitisation 
remains of crucial importance for both market practitioners and regulators. An improved 
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understanding of the commitment mechanisms that banks offer to their securitisation 
structures, as well as their interactions, are one of the key issues to help align bank incentives 
with those of investors and markets. Policy recommendations concerning the future of 
securitisation require a better understanding of these issues. 
3 DATA SELECTION AND SAMPLE SPECIFICATION 
In this paper we use US bank holding company (BHC) data from Y-9C forms obtained 
from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.8 The Y-9C reports are filed by all BHCs since 
1986 and collate quarterly bank financial data on a consolidated basis in the form of a balance 
sheet, an income statement, and detailed supporting schedules, including a schedule of off-
balance sheet items.  
Since June 2001, US banks have been required to provide detailed information on their 
securitisation activities in the regulatory forms. Specifically, banks are required to report the 
following items on the securitisation schedule (Schedule HC-S of the Y-9C report): (i) 
securitised assets, as an outstanding principal balance of assets sold and securitised with 
servicing retained or with recourse or other seller-provided credit enhancements; (ii) 
maximum credit exposure arising from recourse or other seller-provided credit enhancements 
provided to the reported securitisation structures in the form of (a) credit-enhancing interest-
only strips, (b) subordinated securities and other residual interests, and (c) standby letters of 
credit and other enhancements;9 (iii) unused commitments to provide liquidity to 
securitisation structures; (iv) past due amounts, charge-offs, and recoveries on the securitised 
assets; (v) seller’s interests in the form of securities and loans;10 (vi) past due amounts, 
charge-offs, and recoveries in seller’s interests. The schedule also provides information on: (i) 
maximum amount of credit exposure arising from credit enhancements provided by the 
reporting institution to other institutions’ securitisation structures (an aggregate measure of 
credit enhancements including standby letters of credit, purchased subordinated securities, 
and other enhancements); and (ii) reporting institution’s unused commitments to provide 
liquidity to other institutions’ securitisation structures.11  
The incorporation of the new data into the Y-9C reporting forms and the empirical 
design of this study determine year 2001 as the start date of the sample period, which yields 
27 quarters from the second quarter of 2001 to the fourth quarter of 2007. To analyse the 
effect of interests retained in securitisations, we construct a data set of securitising banks. We 
define a bank as a securitiser if there is a non-zero outstanding securitisation in at least one 
                                                 
8 We use data for bank holding companies rather than for commercial banks because risk and capital 
management are typically administered at the highest level of the financial group. Additionally, securitisation 
may involve several subsidiaries of a BHC and affect capital and liquidity planning for the whole group 
(Aggarwal and Jacques 2001, Thomas and Wang 2004). 
9 Credit-enhancing interest-only strips are reported from the second quarter of 2001; subordinated securities and 
standby letters of credit are reported from the first quarter of 2003. 
10 Seller’s interest is reported only for home equity line, credit card, and commercial and industrial loan 
securitisations. 
11 The data on securitisation activities are reported broken down into seven categories according to the 
underlying assets: (i) 1-4 family residential loans; (ii) home equity lines; (iii) credit card receivables; (iv) auto 
loans; (v) other consumer loans; (vi) commercial and industrial loans; and (viii) all other loans, all leases, and all 
other assets.  
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quarter over the sample period. Given that retained interests, our variable of interest, are 
present in all securitisation structures (as a minimum, in the form of excess spread), by 
including the whole population of securitising banks in the sample we avoid a possible 
selection bias.  
When constructing the data set, we exclude banks with missing information on total 
assets, liquidity, loans, deposits, capital, income, and securitisation activities for any quarter 
of the sample period. We also exclude banks with data for less than 2 full years.12 When 
banks go through a merger or an acquisition, the code of the acquiring BHC is maintained. 
Next, we average the quarterly data over the quarters in a year to create bank-year 
observations. Finally, to prevent the possibility of outliers driving the results, we winsorise all 
yearly variables at the 1% level.13 This selection procedure yields 1097 bank-years for 197 
securitising BHCs covering the period 2001-2007.  
4 EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION 
To evaluate the relationship between banks’ retained interests in securitisations and 
insolvency risk, we estimate the following random effects panel regression model (Model 
(1)).  log	ሺܼ௜,௧ሻ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ log൫ܴ݁ݐܽ݅݊݁݀	ܫ݊ݐ݁ݎ݁ݏݐ	ܴܽݐ݅݋௜,௧ିଵ൯ ൅ ߛܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߠܻ݁ܽݎ௧ ൅ ߭௜,௧ 
(1) 
where ߚ, ߛ, and ߠ are coefficient estimates, and ߭௜,௧ is the error term. The dependent variable, ܼ௜,௧ is the insolvency risk of bank i in period t; ܴ݁ݐܽ݅݊݁݀	ܫ݊ݐ݁ݎ݁ݏݐ	ܴܽݐ݅݋௜,௧ିଵ is retained 
interests in securitisation;14 ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧ିଵ is a set of bank-specific control variables; ܻ݁ܽݎ௧ is 
year dummy variables capturing time effects. To alleviate possible endogeneity problems, all 
bank-specific regressors employed in our models are lagged by one period. 
Our primary measure of bank insolvency risk is a z-score, denoted by Z. The z-score has 
become a popular measure of bank risk and has been widely used in the banking literature.15 
The z-score measures the distance from insolvency for a given bank combining bank 
profitability, capitalisation, and volatility of returns: ܼ ൌ ܴܱܣതതതതതത ൅ ܥܽ݌ଓݐ݈ܽതതതതതതതതതതߪோை஺ 	 
(2) 
                                                 
12 For 2001, “full year” refers to the last three quarters of the year as the sample starts from the second quarter of 
2001. 
13 Winsorisation consists of replacing the data below the Nth percentile with the Nth, i.e., a 1% winsorisation 
implies replacing the data below the 1st percentile with the 1st percentile data. 
14 As there are observations with zero retained interests in the data set, we use a logarithm of a unit plus the 
relevant retained interest ratio. 
15 The z-score is an indicator of a bank’s probability of insolvency in the sense that it estimates the number of 
standard deviations that the bank’s profits have to fall below its expected value before its equity becomes 
negative. A higher z-score indicates that a bank is more stable, where the value of the z-score depends positively 
on the bank’s profitability and capital ratio and negatively on the variability of the bank’s profits. See Stiroh and 
Rumble (2006), Hesse and Čihák (2007), Mercieca, Schaeck, and Wolfe (2007), Laeven and Levine (2009). 
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where ܴܱܣതതതതതത is the average return on assets, ܥܽ݌ଓݐ݈ܽതതതതതതതതതത is the average equity capital ratio, and ߪோை஺ is the standard deviation of return on assets.  
To construct z-scores, some studies use the standard deviation of returns over the 
lifetime of a bank in the sample (Laeven and Levine 2009), while others use a rolling time 
window (Čihák et al. 2012). We follow Stiroh and Rumble (2006) and use the standard 
deviation of return on assets over the four quarters in a year. This approach allows us to 
incorporate the variation in all the three components of the z-score over a bank’s lifetime in 
the sample. As shown in Figure 1, the yearly z-score obtained for the sample is highly 
skewed; therefore, we use a natural logarithm of the z-score, which is normally distributed. In 
the remainder of the paper, we use the label ‘‘z-score’’ in referring to the natural logarithm of 
the z-score.  
<Insert Figure 1 about here> 
We investigate the effects of retained interests on bank z-scores controlling for a set of 
variables, captured in ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ, that are likely to influence bank insolvency risk. We begin by 
including the logarithm of the ratio of outstanding securitised assets to total assets 
(logሺܵ݁ܿݑݎ݅ݐ݅ݏܽݐ݅݋݊	ܴܽݐ݅݋ሻ) to control for banks off-balance sheet securitisation activity and, 
possibly, for the provision of implicit recourse.16 In general, previous empirical studies have 
suggested a positive link between securitisation and bank risk (Dionne and Harchaoui 2003, 
Franke and Krahnen 2006, Hänsel and Krahnen 2007, Michalak and Uhde 2012). On the 
other hand, greater outstanding securitisation might increase bank risk aversion, and thereby 
reduce risk taking (Casu et al. 2011). We also include a number of balance sheet and income 
statement characteristics potentially affecting insolvency risk. Specifically, we include bank 
liquidity in the form of cash and securities (ܮ݅ݍݑ݅݀݅ݐݕ	ܴܽݐ݅݋) and anticipate higher liquidity 
buffers to be associated with lower insolvency risk (Laeven and Levine 2009). Trading assets 
(ܶݎܽ݀݅݊݃	ܴܽݐ݅݋) are included to control for their potential risk-increasing effect due to their 
highly volatile nature. Both liquidity and trading assets are scaled by total assets. To control 
for possible differences in riskiness of banks with different loan portfolio concentration, we 
introduce a four-loan Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (ܮ݋ܽ݊	ܪܪܫ); we expect loan portfolio 
concentration to be positively associated with risk (Hirtle and Stiroh 2007, Mercieca, 
Schaeck, and Wolfe 2007). We also control for bank capitalisation introducing an equity 
capital ratio (ܥܽ݌݅ݐ݈ܽ	ܴܽݐ݅݋); lower capital has been associated with higher risk (Stiroh and 
Rumble 2006, Hirtle and Stiroh 2007, Mercieca, Schaeck, and Wolfe 2007). Further, we 
control for potential revenue diversification effect on bank risk using a two-part revenue 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (ܴ݁ݒ݁݊ݑ݁	ܪܪܫ); diversification in revenue sources has been 
shown to be negatively associated with return volatility and insolvency risk (Stiroh and 
Rumble 2006, Hirtle and Stiroh 2007). Following Stiroh and Rumble (2006), we also include 
banks' asset growth (ܣݏݏ݁ݐ	ܩݎ݋ݓݐ݄).17 Finally, to control for any systematic differences across 
banks of different size, we create indicators based on total assets. Following Cebenoyan and 
Strahan (2004) and Demsetz (2000), to avoid imposing a linear (or log-linear) relationship 
between size and the dependent variable, we include dummy indicators for eight asset size 
                                                 
16As there are observations with zero securitisation in the data set, we use a logarithm of a unit plus the 
securitisation ratio. 
17 See Appendix A for detailed construction of the variables. 
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levels (ܣݏݏ݁ݐ	ܮ݁ݒ݈݁	1‐8), with the lowest size group (ܣݏݏ݁ݐ	ܮ݁ݒ݈݁	1) acting as the omitted 
category. 
Given the subordination mechanism of credit-enhancing arrangements, we hypothesise 
that different arrangements have different implications for bank overall risk. To this end, in 
Model (2) we decompose the aggregate retained interests into credit enhancements 
(ܥݎ݁݀݅ݐ	ܧ݄݊ܽ݊ܿ݁݉݁݊ݐ	ܴܽݐ݅݋), liquidity provisions (ܮ݅ݍݑ݅݀݅ݐݕ	ܲݎ݋ݒ݅ݏ݅݋݊	ܴܽݐ݅݋), and seller’s 
interest (݈݈ܵ݁݁ݎᇱݏ	ܫ݊ݐ݁ݎ݁ݏݐ	ܴܽݐ݅݋ሻ. In addition, as the data allow us, in Model (3) we further 
decompose credit enhancements by the form of underlying facility into credit-enhancing 
interest-only strips (ܥݎ݁݀݅ݐ‐ܧ݄݊ܽ݊ܿ݅݊݃	ܫܱ	ܵݐݎ݅݌ݏ	ܴܽݐ݅݋), retained subordinated securities 
(ܵݑܾ݋ݎ݀݅݊ܽݐ݁݀	ܵ݁ܿݑݎ݅ݐݕ	ܴܽݐ݅݋), and standby letters of credit 
(ܵݐܾܽ݊݀ݕ	ܮ݁ݐݐ݁ݎ	݋݂	ܥݎ݁݀݅ݐ	ܴܽݐ݅݋). All else being equal, we expect the relationship between 
the different forms of credit enhancements and insolvency risk to be driven, to a large extent, 
by the level of subordination of the former. 
 In addition to the different types of facility used to provide credit enhancements, the 
interaction between forms of support may add complexity to the relationship between retained 
interests and insolvency risk. In Model (4), we test the effect of credit enhancements for a 
given level of liquidity provisions, and vice versa, by introducing in the model interaction 
terms between credit enhancements and a high liquidity provision dummy (the latter is equal 
to one for observations with liquidity provisions above the mean value) and between liquidity 
provisions and a high credit enhancement dummy (the latter is equal to one for observations 
with credit enhancements above the mean value), denoted by ܥݎ݁݀ܧ݄݊ ൈ ܪ݄݅݃ܮ݅ݍܲݎ݋ݒܦݑ݉݉ݕ and ܮ݅ݍܲݎ݋ݒ ൈ ܪ݄݅݃ܥݎ݁݀ܧ݄݊ܦݑ݉݉ݕ, respectively. 
 In our final model, Model (5), in addition to interests retained by banks in own 
securitisation structures, we include interests in third-party securitisation structures, both in 
the form of third-party credit enhancements (݄ܶ݅ݎ݀‐ܲܽݎݐݕ	ܥݎ݁݀݅ݐ	ܧ݄݊ܽ݊ܿ݁݉݁݊ݐ	ܴܽݐ݅݋) and 
liquidity provisions (݄ܶ݅ݎ݀‐ܲܽݎݐݕ	ܮ݅ݍݑ݅݀݅ݐݕ	ܲݎ݋ݒ݅ݏ݅݋݊	ܴܽݐ݅݋). In the run up to the financial 
crisis, large banks were also active providers of third-party enhancements to other 
institutions’ securitisation structures, in direct competition with insurance companies.  
5 RESULTS 
5.1 Summary Statistics 
Before turning to the main regression analysis, we examine the sample banks along: (i) 
balance sheet structure; (ii) loan portfolio; (iii) regulatory capital; (iv) operating performance; 
(v) risk characteristics; and (vi) securitisation activities.18 To this end, we calculate time-series 
averages for each BHC, which are then used to obtain the statistics for the sample. The results 
are presented in Table 1.  
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
                                                 
18 The construction of the variables is described in detail in Appendix A. 
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We find that the average size of BHCs in the sample is slightly over $46 billion, with a 
wide range from around $0.2 billion to $1,150 billion in total assets. Of those assets, on 
average, 25% is held in the form of liquid assets and around 1% in the form of trading assets. 
The loan portfolio constitutes around 64% of BHCs’ total assets and is, on average, 
diversified as suggested by the loan Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of 0.56.19 Turning to 
the liability side, the sample banks are mainly financed by deposits, which constitute around 
60% of total assets. The capitalisation of the sample BHCs is around 10%; looking at the 
regulatory capital, the sample BHCs tend to be relatively highly capitalised (for example, the 
mean of total risk-based capital ratio is around 14%).  
Looking at the performance measures, the data suggest that interest income constitutes 
the main source of revenue for the sample banks (around 69%), with the two-part revenue 
HHI of 0.64. As for the net income, it constitutes, on average, around 14% of equity or 1% of 
total assets of the sample banks. Looking at the risk characteristics of the banks, we find that 
for the average BHC in the sample the risk-weighted assets to total assets (RWATA) ratio is 
0.73; non-performing loans constitute 1% of total loans, while the charge-offs and loan loss 
provisions constitute around 0.5% relative to total loans.  
We next proceed to discuss some securitisation statistics, which are reported in the last 
panel of Table 1. The data show that the amount of outstanding securitised assets constitutes, 
on average, around 8% of banks’ total assets, while contractual interests retained in 
connection to securitised assets in the form of credit enhancements, liquidity support, and 
seller’s interest, constitute in aggregate 0.5% of total assets. Looking at the distribution across 
the forms of retained interests, credit enhancements constitute 0.2% of total assets, liquidity 
provisions constitute 0.02%, and seller’s interest constitutes 0.3% of total assets.20 Finally, 
breaking down credit enhancements by the form of underlying facility, we find that credit-
enhancing interest-only strips constitute, on average, 0.07% of total assets, subordinated 
securities constitute 0.11%, and standby letters of credit constitute 0.06% of total assets. 
Table 1 also reports information on banks’ engagement in other institutions’ securitisations in 
the form of credit and/or liquidity support. We find that the credit exposure arising from credit 
enhancements provided by the sample banks to other institutions’ securitisations constitutes 
0.003% of banks’ total assets, while banks’ commitments to provide liquidity constitute 
0.004% of total assets. 
To analyse the data on banks’ securitisation activities not diluted by zero securitisation 
values, Table 2 provides statistics for observations with:  (i) non-zero total outstanding 
securitisation; (ii) non-zero mortgage securitisation; (iii) non-zero home equity line 
securitisation; (iv) non-zero credit card securitisation; (v) non-zero auto securitisation; (vi) 
non-zero other consumer loan securitisation; (vii) non-zero commercial and industrial 
securitisation; and (viii) non-zero all other loan, lease, and asset securitisation.  
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
                                                 
19 Loan Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is calculated using four loan categories: (i) real estate loans, (ii) 
commercial and industrial loans, (iii) consumer loans, and (iv) other loans; a higher HHI value indicates higher 
loan portfolio concentration. 
20 Seller’s interest in home equity line, credit card, commercial and industrial loan securitisations. 
17 
 
First, looking at the statistics on the number of banks across the securitised asset 
classes, one can see that most of the sample banks conduct mortgage securitisations, followed 
by securitisations of all other loans and leases; while the smallest number of banks is engaged 
in other consumer loan securitisation.21 The data show that the mean of total outstanding 
securitisation is around 9% of banks’ total assets.  
Looking at the structure of securitisations, retained interests constitute, on average, 8% 
of securitised assets outstanding, with the highest value of 17% in credit card securitisations. 
Looking at the break down of retained interests: (i) credit enhancements constitute around 5% 
of securitised assets (around 1% in the form of credit-enhancing interest-only strips; 2% in the 
form of subordinated securities; and 1% in the form of standby letters of credit); (ii) liquidity 
provisions constitute around 0.4%; and (iii) the seller’s interest constitutes around 2% of 
securitised assets.  
Analysing the provision of retained interests by the type of assets securitised, we find 
the highest level of credit enhancements is provided in auto securitisations; the highest level 
of liquidity provisions is offered to other consumer loan securitisations; and the highest 
seller’s interest is retained in credit card securitisations.  
Looking at the quality of assets, non-performing securitised loans constitute around 
0.6% of securitised assets, which is nearly half the size of the on-balance sheet non-
performing loan ratio (1%, reported in Table 1); however, the charge-offs on securitised loans 
of 0.4% is comparable to those on the on-balance sheet loans (0.5%, reported in Table 1). 
Interestingly, other consumer securitisations show the highest non-performing loan ratio and 
the second highest charge-off ratio, exceeded only by charge-offs in credit card 
securitisations; while securitisations of all other loans and assets seem to have the highest 
credit quality of underlying assets in terms of non-performing loans and charge-offs. 
5.2 Main Findings 
We now turn to the regression analysis to test the relationship between banks’ retained 
interests in securitisations and insolvency risk. We estimate random effects regressions22 
using the sample of 900 bank-years for 197 BHCs from 2002 to 2007.23 In each regression, 
the standard errors are adjusted to control for clustering at the bank level. The correlation 
matrix between the main regression variables is reported in Appendix B. 
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
Table 3 reports the first set of results of our investigation into the effect of banks’ 
retained interests on insolvency risk. The first column of Table 3 reports the results of our 
Model (1) presented in equation (1). The coefficient on retained interests is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. In other words, the interests retained by the originating 
                                                 
21 It is common for a bank to engage in several types of securitisation (e.g., most of the mortgage securitisers in 
the sample engage in securitisations of other asset classes). 
22 Appendix C reports the results of the Hausman specification test. 
23 As the empirical specification requires lagging the explanatory variables, the 2001 observations have to be 
dropped from the estimations. 
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banks in their securitisations and constituting, on average, only 0.5% of the banks’ total assets 
significantly increase their insolvency risk.  
Column (2) of Table 3 reports the results of Model (2), where we decompose total 
retained interests by the form of underlying facility into credit enhancements, liquidity 
provisions, and seller’s interest. We find that credit enhancements and seller’s interest have a 
risk-increasing effect; in both cases the coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% level. 
Liquidity provisions do not seem to affect bank risk. We tentatively explain these results by 
considering the type of facility and the subordination structure of a “typical” securitisation 
transaction. Specifically, liquidity provisions are, in general, excess funds provided by the 
originator to the SPV as a buffer, so the first loss is absorbed by the SPV rather than by the 
bank. As a consequence, liquidity provisions seem not to have an impact on bank risk. On the 
other hand, credit enhancements appear to have the strongest risk-increasing effect, consistent 
with their subordination to other forms of retained interests.  
As credit enhancements seem to drive the negative impact of retained interests on bank 
risk, we analyse this relationship in more detail and expand the model by the type of 
underlying credit-enhancing facility (Model (3)). Specifically, in column (3) of Table 3, we 
decompose credit enhancements into credit-enhancing interest-only strips, subordinated 
securities, and standby letters of credit.24 The results show that among the three forms of 
credit enhancements, credit-enhancing interest-only strips have the strongest and statistically 
significant risk-increasing effect, consistent with their subordinated (first-loss) position. 
Standby letters of credit also have a statistically significant risk-increasing effect; while the 
coefficient on subordinated securities emerges positive, albeit not statistically significant. 
These results are consistent with the subordinated structure of securitisation transactions and 
indicate that further efforts should be made to understand the subordination mechanisms more 
clearly. While it might be desirable to keep retention mechanisms flexible, as proposed by 
Section 941 of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act, our results support the idea of increased disclosure 
of the subordination structure of retained interests and the capital structure of the resulting 
charges. 
Next, we control for the interaction between forms of retained interests. Recall that in 
Model (4) we test the effect of credit enhancements for a given level of liquidity provisions 
and liquidity provisions for a given level of credit enhancements by introducing interaction 
terms between credit enhancements and a high liquidity provision dummy and between 
liquidity provisions and a high credit enhancements dummy 
(ܥݎ݁݀ܧ݄݊ ൈ ܪ݄݅݃ܮ݅ݍܲݎ݋ݒܦݑ݉݉ݕ	 and ܮ݅ݍܲݎ݋ݒ ൈ ܪ݄݅݃ܥݎ݁݀ܧ݄݊ܦݑ݉݉ݕ, respectively). The 
results are reported in column (4) of Table 3. Interestingly, the evidence suggests that the 
effect of credit enhancements reverses to risk-decreasing in securitisations with high liquidity 
provisions; while the level of credit enhancements is found to have no significant impact of 
the risk effect of liquidity provisions. This result might again be explained by the intrinsic 
                                                 
24 Credit-enhancing interest-only strips are reported by banks starting from the second quarter of 2001, while the 
starting reporting date for subordinated securities and standby letters of credit is the first quarter of 2003. As this 
model specification is crucial for this study, we drop the 2002 and 2003 observations (the latter is dropped due to 
lagging the explanatory variables) and estimate the model for the 2004-2007 period. In all other model 
specifications we control for credit enhancements in the aggregated form to avoid losing the data for year 2002. 
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nature of liquidity provisions and the subordination structure; for example, if liquidity is 
offered to the SPV in the form of a cash account, the latter is junior to the claims of 
subordinated securities. As a consequence, a higher liquidity buffer would absorb a portion of 
risk that would not revert back on the bank balance sheet. 
Finally, in Model (5) we test whether interests in third-party securitisations affect bank 
insolvency risk. A bank’s interests in third-party securitisations is measured by credit and 
liquidity support provided by the bank to other institutions’ securitisation structures 
(ܱݐ݄݁ݎݏᇱ	ܥݎ݁݀݅ݐ	ܧ݄݊ܽ݊ܿ݁݉݁݊ݐ	ܴܽݐ݅݋ and ܱݐ݄݁ݎݏᇱ	ܮ݅ݍݑ݅݀݅ݐݕ	ܲݎ݋ݒ݅ݏ݅݋݊	ܴܽݐ݅݋, respectively). 
The results are reported in column (5) of Table 3. The data show that interests in third-party 
securitisations in either form do not have significant effect on risk of the banks.  
Examining the control variables, the data show no significant relationship between 
outstanding securitisation and bank risk. We find, as expected, a negative and statistically 
significant effect of liquidity on bank insolvency risk (a positive effect on the z-score) 
suggesting that higher levels of liquid assets reduce bank risk. In contrast, the effect of trading 
assets on risk is found to be positive (a negative relationship with the z-score) and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Further, the estimates for capital, asset growth, loan and revenue 
diversification are not statistically significant. These results remain consistent in all 
specifications.  
Summarising the main results, we find evidence that different forms of banks’ 
engagement in securitisation structures have different effects on bank insolvency risk. 
Specifically, we find that the aggregate amount of retained interests significantly increases 
insolvency risk. Decomposing retained interests by the form of underlying facility, we find 
that credit enhancements and seller’s interest have a positive and statistically significant 
association with bank insolvency risk, while this is not the case for liquidity provisions. In 
addition, we find evidence to suggest that the risk-increasing effect of credit enhancements is 
mainly driven by credit-enhancing interest-only strips and standby letters of credit, 
consistently with the claims’ subordination structure. We also find that the effect of credit 
enhancements reverses to risk-decreasing in securitisations with high liquidity provisions; 
while the level of credit enhancements is found to have no significant impact of the risk effect 
of liquidity provisions. Finally, we find that banks’ engagement in third-party securitisations, 
both through credit enhancements and liquidity provisions, has no significant effect on 
insolvency risk.  
5.3 Components of Z-Score 
The use of the z-score as a measure of risk entails the possibility of the results being 
driven by one of the components constituting the measure. To analyse the effect of retained 
interests on the z-score in more detail and to identify the drivers of the relationship between 
the two, we decompose the z-score into its individual components: capital ratio, return on 
assets, and standard deviation of return on assets. We re-estimate equation (1) with each of 
the components as the dependent variable. In the regression of the capital ratio, we omit the 
capital ratio from the control variables to avoid biased estimates. The results of the three 
estimations are presented in Table 4. 
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<Insert Table 4 about here> 
Our findings indicate that the negative relationship between z-scores and retained 
interests is mainly driven by the increasing effect of retained interests on the volatility of 
returns.  
5.4 Level of Securitisation Activity 
In our main regression analysis, we control for the level of securitisation by introducing 
an outstanding securitisation variable in the model (that is, the ratio of outstanding securitised 
assets to total assets). The data showed no significant effect of outstanding securitisation on 
the bank risk. 
However, the level of securitisation activity may have an impact on the risk effect of 
retained interests. Specifically, a bank entering the securitisation market for the first time 
and/or still establishing its reputation in the market is likely to securitise asset pools of 
moderate size and to include assets of good quality to ensure the performance of 
securitisations (Higgins and Mason 2004, Casu et al. 2013). In this case, retained interests 
should not significantly affect bank insolvency risk as the losses on the underlying assets are 
likely to be within the expected or normal rate of portfolio credit loss, already embedded in 
the structure (OCC 1997). This bank is also likely to originate good quality loans after the 
securitisation, either for subsequent securitisations or to keep on the balance sheet. In other 
words, for first-time/small-scale securitisers, retained interests may increase banks’ incentives 
to screen and monitor borrowers. Consequently, in line with the signalling hypothesis 
discussed in the literature, for banks with a low securitisation activity, we would expect 
retained interests to be negatively associated with bank insolvency risk.  
In contrast, a bank that is an active securitiser and that securitises assets in large 
volumes may be more likely to lower its lending standards to attract new borrowers (Shin 
2009). This would lead to a deterioration of the credit quality of assets to be securitised and 
hence to an increase in the riskiness of any interests retained in connection to those assets. 
Moreover, a bank that is active in the securitisation market as an issuer tends to have a 
pipeline of securitisations and thus retained interests are likely to grow over time as 
securitisation activity increases (Erel, Nadauld, and Stulz 2012). This may lead to a 
concentration of risks (in the form of retained interests in outstanding securitisations) on the 
bank’s books. This may be further exacerbated if a bank uses securitisation for regulatory 
capital arbitrage, that is, the guarantees are structured to reduce capital requirements while 
providing recourse to the bank’s balance sheets for outside investors (Acharya, Schnabl, and 
Suarez 2012). Erel, Nadauld, and Stulz (2012) suggest that large banks are more likely to use 
securitisation to reduce regulatory capital charges because of the fixed costs of securitisation; 
large banks are also likely to securitise more frequent and larger pools of assets (Loutskina 
2011). Consequently, for (large) banks with a high level of securitisation activity (“large-
scale” securitisers), we would expect retained interests to increase bank insolvency risk. 
To test whether the effect of retained interests varies with the level of securitisation 
activity, we split the sample banks into three sub-samples based on their average level of 
outstanding securitisation across the sample years. We create three quantile categories (low, 
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medium, and high) for the total outstanding securitisation variable (ܵ݁ܿݑݎ݅ݐ݅ݏܽݐ݅݋݊	ܴܽݐ݅݋) and 
then assign each bank to one of the three categories based on the bank’s time-series average 
securitisation. We then estimate the regression in equation (1) for each sub-sample. The 
results are reported in Table 5.  
<Insert Table 5 about here> 
The data suggest that the risk effect of retained interests varies with the level of 
securitisation. In line with our expectations, we find that the effect of retained interests is risk-
reducing for banks with low levels of securitisation activity and reverses to risk-increasing for 
banks with high levels of securitisation activity. This evidence suggests that for “small-scale” 
securitisers and/or first-time securitisers the “skin in the game” seems to improve their 
incentives to originate high quality assets. On the other hand, risk retention appears to lose its 
power to provide incentives to reduce the overall risk for “large-scale” securitisers. This 
finding is particularly relevant to the current policy debate as it emphasises the importance of 
considering securitisation activity at the individual bank level when designing risk retention 
requirements.  
5.5 Instrumental Variable Analysis 
An important issue that arises when attempting to estimate the effects of securitisation 
on bank performance is that the securitisation decision may be endogenous, that is, banks 
determine whether to access the securitisation market, when to securitise, and how to 
structure the transaction (Casu et al. 2013). In this specific context, the endogeneity bias may 
arise from the potential reverse causality, that is, the level of retained interests may be driven 
by the risk of the originating bank. Specifically, the financial condition of the bank might 
influence the amount of credit enhancements necessary to achieve a certain rating or to ensure 
the placement of the securities backed by the underlying assets. This would results in the 
estimates from the baseline regression (Model (1) in Table 3) to be biased. While using a lag 
of retained interests in the baseline specification can partially address the endogeneity issue, 
we verify our results by employing an instrumental variable (IV) approach in the regression 
specification in equation (1).  
To use the IV approach, we need to find a valid instrument, an observable variable not 
in equation (1), that satisfies two conditions, relevance and exclusion (Wooldridge 2002). The 
relevance condition requires a non-zero relationship between the instrument and the 
endogenous variable, that is, retained interests. The exclusion condition requires the 
instrument to be uncorrelated with the error term in equation (1). As a candidate for the 
instrument, we choose the ratio of net charge-offs on securitised assets to securitised assets, in 
a logarithmic form and lagged by one period. Net charge-offs represent the amount of loans 
securitised by a bank that have been charged off or otherwise designated as losses by the SPV 
minus recoveries on securitised assets (FRB 2007).  
With regards to the relevance condition, the volume of retained interests, by 
construction, depends on the quality of underlying assets; retained interests are also used to 
maintain the assigned rating level of the outstanding securities based on the performance of 
the underlying pool (Mandel, Morgan, and Wei 2012). Therefore, we expect a strong positive 
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relationship between retained interests and charge-offs on securitised assets. As for the 
exclusion condition, we expect no direct impact on the originating bank’s insolvency risk of 
charge-offs on securitised assets, as the latter should be borne by the SPV and not by the 
originating bank (Vermilyea, Webb, and Kish 2008). Confirming our expectations, Appendix 
B shows that the charge-offs on securitised assets are strongly (positively) correlated with 
retained interests, while they are weakly correlated with the z-score.  
For the IV analysis, we employ a two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator with random 
effects and a robust-clustering at the bank level. The results of the estimation are reported in 
Table 6. The first column reports the first stage regression, where our instrument, log	ሺܥ݄ܽݎ݃݁‐ܱ݂ ௌ݂௘௖	ܴܽݐ݅݋), enters positively and statistically significant, while all control 
variables exhibit the expected signs. All else equal, the data show that the lower the quality of 
the underlying assets (the higher the charge-offs on securitised assets), the higher the retained 
interests of the originating bank.  
Further verifying the validity of our instrument, Table 6 reports the underidentification 
and weak identification tests. For the former, we use Kleibergen-Paap rank LM statistic which 
is robust under heteroskedasticity and clustering on identifier in the case of a single 
endogenous variable and a single instrument (Michalak and Uhde 2012). The value of the test 
is 7.803, rejecting the null hypothesis that the equation is underidentified at the 0.5% level. 
For the weak identification, the Kleibergen-Paap rank Wald F statistic is at 13.19, close to the 
Stock and Yogo (2005) 10% critical value of 16.38, rejecting the null hypothesis of a weak 
correlation between the endogenous variable and the instrument, that is, between retained 
interests and charge-offs on securitised assets. 
The second stage of our instrumental variable analysis is reported in the second column 
of Table 6. The results confirm our main finding of a significant and negative effect of 
retained interests on insolvency risk (positive effect on the z-score) Therefore, the data show 
that the endogeneity of the securitisation decision does not seem to drive our main results. 
6 OTHER ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
We conduct a series of additional tests to verify the robustness of our main results to 
outliers, alternative risk measures, and sub-periods. The tests are discussed below in more 
detail with the results presented in Table 7.  
<Insert Table 7 about here> 
6.1 Outliers 
Our first concern is the possibility that outliers in terms of risk, that is, banks close to 
insolvency, might drive our results. We address this concern by winsorising our risk measure, 
the z-score, at higher 2.5% and 5% levels. We then re-estimate Model (2) for each of the 
winsorisation levels. The results of the regressions are reported in columns (1)-(2) of Table 7. 
The data show that all the coefficients remain qualitatively unchanged confirming our main 
results. 
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6.2 Measures of Risk 
The second concern is the robustness of our results to alternative measures of risk. To 
address this, we use different measures for the dependent variable. Following Stiroh and 
Rumble (2006), we use banks’ risk-adjusted return on assets and equity. Following Berger, 
Klapper, and Turk-Ariss (2009), we also use the ratio of non-performing loans to loans as a 
proxy for bank soundness. We re-estimate Model (2), consistently winsorising the risk 
measures at the 1% level. The results of the regressions are reported in columns (3)-(5) of 
Table 7. The evidence from the estimations confirms our main result of a significant risk-
increasing effect of credit enhancements and seller’ interest.  
6.3 Sub-Periods 
As our sample covers the 2001-2007 period, there is a concern that the results might be 
affected by the outset of the financial crisis in 2007. To test the robustness of the results to 
alternative time periods, we split the sample period into 2002-2005 (which can be considered 
a more "stable" period) and 2006-2007 (when the first signs of the crisis could be reflected in 
the amount and risk effect of contractual retained interests). We re-estimate Model (2) for 
each of the sub-periods and report the results in column (6) of Table 7.  
We find that the effect of credit enhancements remains risk-increasing and statistically 
significant for both periods; interestingly though, the magnitude of the effect more than 
doubles in the 2006-2007 regression. The latter is consistent with the view that the risk effect 
of credit enhancements provided by banks in securitisations was magnified by the outset of 
the financial crisis. This could be driven either by a deterioration in the quality of the assets 
being securitised (as posited by recent literature, including Mian and Sufi (2009), Keys et al. 
(2010), Dell’Ariccia, Igan, and Laeven (2012)), or by an increase in the use of commitments 
and guarantees (Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez 2012), or possibly both. 
Overall, we find that our main findings are consistent across several robustness tests and 
that the positive relationship between contractual retained interests and risk holds throughout 
the analyses. 
7 CONCLUSIONS 
The academic literature has provided various motives for the retention of economic 
interests in securitisations by the originating banks. These include mitigation of information 
asymmetries, regulatory arbitrage, and liquidity creation. However, as the 2007-2009 
financial crisis showed, the practice of retaining contractual interests in securitisation 
structures resulted in the originating banks retaining on their balance sheets the risk of 
securitised assets. This contributed to the collapse of the securitisation market. Given the 
current regulatory efforts to revive the market and the importance attached to risk retention 
mechanisms in terms of their role in potentially aligning the incentives of banks and investors 
in the securitisation process (the so called "skin in the game"), an improved understanding of 
these aforementioned issues is crucial. Despite their importance, attention has focussed 
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mainly on tranching and, specifically on the retention of the equity tranche, and has largely 
ignored other commitment mechanisms. 
This paper contributes to the current debate by examining the relationship between 
different forms of retained interests and bank insolvency risk. Using US bank holding 
company data for the period from 2001 to 2007, we find that the overall level of contractual 
retained interests and guarantees offered to own securitisation structures increases bank 
insolvency risk, although this varies for different levels of securitisation outstanding. 
Specifically, for “large-scale” securitisers retained interests increase overall risk, while for 
“small-scale” and/or first-time securitisers they appear to have a risk-reducing effect.  
In addition, we find that the type of facility provided, as well as the possible interactions 
among different facilities, have implications for bank risk. Specifically, we find that credit 
enhancements and seller’s interest have a risk-increasing effect, while the provision of 
liquidity support does not appear to impact risk. The results also show that the effect of credit 
enhancements is reversed to risk-decreasing in securitisations with high liquidity provisions, 
while the level of credit enhancements is found to have no significant impact of the risk effect 
of liquidity provisions. We explain this result by the intrinsic nature of liquidity support. 
Specifically, liquidity can be provided to the SPV under different arrangements; if it is 
provided as a separate reserve fund then it is commonly used to cover shortfalls and it is 
junior to all other claims. This entails that the losses that can be covered by the provision are 
borne by the SPV and should not affect the originating bank's insolvency risk.  
Analysing credit enhancements in more detail, we find that credit-enhancing interest-
only strips have the strongest risk-increasing effect, consistently with their subordinated (first-
loss) position. Standby letters of credit also have a risk-increasing effect, while the empirical 
results show no evidence of a significant risk effect of subordinated securities. This is a 
particularly interesting result as it offers some support to the theoretical literature on the 
mitigating effect on bank risk taking of holding a subordinated/equity tranche. Finally, we 
find that engagement in third-party securitisations through providing credit and/or liquidity 
support does not have significant effect on bank risk.  
Overall, our results highlight that the relationship between retained interests and bank 
insolvency risk varies according to the type of provision offered, the subordination structure, 
and it is altered by interactions among provisions. While it might be desirable not to become 
too prescriptive in the choice of retention mechanisms available to originating banks, our 
results support the idea of increased transparency and mandatory disclosure of retained 
interests with a clear indication of the subordination mechanisms. The results also indicate 
that the risk effect of credit enhancements increased at the onset of the crisis. This could be 
explained either by a deterioration of the quality of assets being securitised at the time (hence 
requiring higher credit and liquidity support to achieve a high enough debt rating to be 
marketable) or by an increased use of commitments and guarantees on behalf of banks for 
other purposes (for example, regulatory capital arbitrage and liquidity creation).  
In conclusion, the results presented in this paper contribute to a deeper understanding of 
the risks arising from banks’ securitisation activities, and have direct implications for the on-
going discussions on how to redesign the securitisation model and restart this important 
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market. Indeed, policy makers acknowledge the potential benefits of securitisation in credit 
risk transfer and diversification, and aim at reviving the securitisation market by introducing 
more standardised and simple securitisation structures reducing the dependence and 
involvement of the originator in the transactions.   
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Figure 1 Distribution of Z-Score and Ln(Z-Score)  
 
Note: The graphs plot the distribution of Z-Score and ln(Z-Score) derived from the regression data set for 
the 2002-2007 period, where the z-score of a bank is calculated yearly using the averages and standard 
deviations across four quarters of a year and winsorised at the 1% level. 
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Table 1 Sample Descriptive Statistics  
  Full Sample 
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Balance Sheet Structure     
Total Assets ($ billions) 46.0724 150.8538 0.1692 1150.00 
Liquidity Ratio 0.2502 0.1147 0.0360 0.6048 
Loan Ratio 0.6408 0.1420 0.0762 0.8863 
Trading Ratio 0.0130 0.0391 0.0000 0.2294 
Deposit Ratio 0.5976 0.1485 0.0457 0.8350 
Capital Ratio 0.0954 0.0458 0.0477 0.4640 
Loan Portfolio     
Real Estate Loan Ratio 0.6566 0.1925 0.0296 0.9732 
C&I Loan Ratio 0.1609 0.0854 0.0003 0.4156 
Consumer Loan Ratio 0.1008 0.1169 0.0004 0.7206 
Other Loan Ratio 0.0779 0.1163 0.0000 0.6635 
Loan HHI 0.5551 0.1636 0.2820 0.9530 
Regulatory Capital     
Tier I Leverage Ratio 9.0867 4.5593 3.2075 46.1747 
Tier I Risk-Based Capital Ratio 12.4529 6.5569 4.5300 65.7928 
Total Risk-Based Capital Ratio 14.3632 6.3301 5.8450 67.1647 
Performance     
Interest Income/Net Operating Revenue 0.6920 0.1751 0.1154 0.9435 
Revenue HHI 0.6431 0.0978 0.5007 0.9377 
Interest Margin 0.0218 0.0053 0.0056 0.0426 
ROE 0.1366 0.0604 -0.0696 0.4429 
ROA  0.0129 0.0097 -0.0041 0.0928 
Risk Characteristics     
RWATA Ratio 0.7245 0.1248 0.3724 1.0204 
NPL Ratio 0.0101 0.0074 0.0002 0.0404 
Charge-Off Ratio 0.0047 0.0066 0.0000 0.0427 
Loan Loss Provision Ratio 0.0057 0.0073 -0.0005 0.0515 
Loan Loss Allowance Ratio 0.0143 0.0059 0.0023 0.0415 
Z-Score  95.1717 69.5363 7.2231 327.8096 
RAROA  11.3932 9.3022 -0.4005 43.4955 ROA 0.0037 0.0037 0.0007 0.0331 
RAROE 10.7410 8.7599 -0.3514 53.4815 ROE  0.0717 0.0737 0.0133 0.4144 
Securitisation Activity     
Securitisation Ratio 0.0755 0.2048 0.0000 1.5390 
Retained Interest Ratio 0.0052 0.0159 0.0000 0.1032 
Credit Enhancement Ratio 0.0021 0.0062 0.0000 0.0416 
Credit-Enhancing Interest-Only Strip Ratio 0.0007 0.0025 0.0000 0.0206 
Subordinated Security Ratio 0.0011 0.0040 0.0000 0.0272 
Standby Letter of Credit Ratio 0.0006 0.0036 0.0000 0.0353 
Liquidity Provision Ratio 0.0002 0.0010 0.0000 0.0100 
Seller’s Interest Ratio 0.0028 0.0121 0.0000 0.0817 
NPLSec Ratio 0.0044 0.0082 0.0000 0.0466 
Charge-OffSec Ratio 0.0034 0.0086 0.0000 0.0416 
Third-Party Credit Enhancement Ratio 0.00003 0.0001 0.0000 0.0012 
Third-Party Liquidity Provision Ratio 0.00004 0.0003 0.0000 0.0033 
Note: The table presents general descriptive statistics for the full sample of 197 banks covering the period from 2001 to 2007. 
Mean, Std Dev, Min, and Max stand for the cross-sectional mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values of the 
individual bank time-series averages, accordingly. All variables are winsorised at the 1% level. For the definition and 
construction of the variables see Appendix A. 
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Table 2 Statistics on Securitisation Activity  
 Total 
Securitisation 
Mortgage HEL Credit Card Auto Other 
Consumer 
C&I All Other 
Variable Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
   
Outstanding Securitisation                
Securitisation Ratio 8.98 22.43 7.70 18.83 0.90 0.95 4.44 6.90 1.37 2.15 1.36 1.90 0.95 0.87 1.60 2.16 
  
 
Retained Interests                 
Retained Interest Ratio 0.60 1.73 0.16 0.61 0.12 0.20 1.78 2.83 0.08 0.11 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.15 0.11 0.22 
Retained Interest/Securitisation Ratio 7.85 18.21 5.03 17.18 14.03 14.54 17.29 22.66 7.89 6.17 10.77 8.90 10.37 14.54 6.94 10.33 
  
 
Credit Enhancements                 
Credit Enhancement Ratio 0.26 0.78 0.16 0.61 0.06 0.07 0.20 0.39 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.08 
Credit Enhancement/Securitisation Ratio 4.89 14.61 4.38 15.05 5.47 4.76 2.26 2.83 7.25 5.75 6.11 4.49 1.69 2.39 4.79 7.42 
Credit-Enhancing Interest-Only Strip Ratio 8.00 0.32 0.06 0.30 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.11 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 
Credit-Enhancing Interest-Only Strip/Securitisation Ratio 0.99 2.65 0.64 2.51 1.65 1.66 0.53 0.65 4.14 3.81 2.75 2.42 0.61 1.33 0.59 1.35 
Subordinated Security Ratio 0.16 0.49 0.04 0.12 0.05 0.10 0.21 0.34 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.08 
Subordinated Security/Securitisation Ratio 2.28 6.71 2.43 9.04 3.06 3.30 2.48 2.49 2.93 3.81 3.20 4.83 1.58 2.01 3.15 5.07 
Standby Letter of Credit Ratio 0.08 0.40 0.08 0.45 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 
Standby Letter of Credit /Securitisation Ratio 1.39 6.19 1.26 5.42 0.20 0.36 0.16 0.43 0.68 1.26 0.46 0.89 0.29 0.68 2.06 6.41 
  
 
Liquidity Provisions                 
Liquidity Provision Ratio 0.02 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 
Liquidity Provision/Securitisation Ratio 0.39 2.20 0.07 0.52 0.08 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.63 4.64 0.00 0.00 0.35 1.15 
  
 
Seller's Interest                 
Seller’s Interest Ratio 0.30 1.26   0.02 0.03 1.58 2.60     0.02 0.04   
Seller’s Interest/Securitisation Ratio 1.72 5.68   4.87 5.97 15.65 21.54     6.23 12.18   
  
 
Non-Performing Assets and Charge-Offs               
NPLSec Ratio 0.55 0.96 0.70 1.51 1.26 1.44 0.97 0.88 0.36 0.41 2.64 2.20 0.26 0.39 0.14 0.26 
Charge-OffSec Ratio 0.42 0.99 0.14 0.56 0.39 0.43 1.98 1.78 1.39 1.91 1.44 1.75 0.14 0.25 0.01 0.03 
  
 
No. of BHCs 197 147 27 36 34 22 26 44 
Note: The table presents descriptive statistics on securitisation activities for observations with: (i) non-zero total outstanding securitisation; (ii) non-zero mortgage securitisation; (iii) non-zero home equity line securitisation; 
(iv) non-zero credit card securitisation; (v) non-zero auto securitisation; (vi) non-zero other consumer loan securitisation; (vii) non-zero commercial and industrial securitisation; and (viii) non-zero all other loan, lease and 
asset securitisation. Mean and Std Dev stand for the cross-sectional mean and standard deviation values (in %) of the individual bank time-series averages, accordingly. All variables are winsorised at the 1% level. The last raw 
reports the number of banks in the according sub-sample. For the definition and construction of the variables see Appendix A. 
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Table 3 Retained Interests and Bank Insolvency Risk 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
log(Retained Interest Ratioi,t-1) -12.67***     
 (-3.109)     
log(Credit Enhancement Ratioi,t-1)  -18.55**  -21.06** -18.42** 
  (-2.124)  (-2.425) (-2.104) 
log(Credit-Enhancing Interest-Only Strip Ratioi,t-1)   -48.75**   
   (-2.555)   
log(Subordinated Security Ratioi,t-1)   16.99   
   (0.815)   
log(Standby Letter of Credit Ratioi,t-1)   -25.56***   
   (-2.689)   
log(Liquidity Provision Ratioi,t-1)  12.00 -21.67 -6.98 12.98 
  (0.240) (-0.330) (-0.161) (0.240) 
log(Seller’s Interest Ratioi,t-1)  -8.82** -15.64** -8.04* -8.95** 
  (-2.249) (-2.042) (-1.957) (-2.250) 
CredEnh x HighLiqProvDummyi,t-1    89.40***  
    (3.308)  
LiqProv x HighCredEnhDummyi,t-1    -41.12  
 
   (-0.580)  
log(Third-Party Credit Enhancement Ratioi,t-1)     188.01 
     (1.104) 
log(Third-Party Liquidity Provision Ratioi,t-1)     -8.54 
     (-0.101) 
log(Securitisation Ratioi,t-1) 0.29 0.34 -0.02 0.37 0.35 
 
(0.659) (0.763) (-0.040) (0.839) (0.786) 
Liquidity Ratioi,t-1 0.87* 0.89* 0.59 0.91* 0.89* 
 (1.847) (1.870) (1.225) (1.928) (1.858) 
Loan HHIi,t-1 -0.45 -0.48 -0.30 -0.45 -0.47 
 (-1.167) (-1.239) (-0.686) (-1.170) (-1.207) 
Trading Ratioi,t-1 -5.95*** -5.94*** -5.22** -6.18*** -6.01*** 
 (-2.940) (-2.855) (-2.439) (-2.942) (-2.916) 
Capital Ratioi,t-1 -0.41 -0.31 -1.33 -0.29 -0.30 
 (-0.373) (-0.285) (-1.096) (-0.266) (-0.279) 
Revenue HHIi,t-1 -0.13 -0.08 0.19 -0.07 -0.08 
 (-0.243) (-0.157) (0.322) (-0.131) (-0.152) 
Asset Growthi,t-1 0.88 0.80 0.16 0.75 0.84 
 (0.981) (0.910) (0.144) (0.857) (0.944) 
Asset Level 2i,t-1 0.21 0.22 0.28 0.22 0.22 
 (1.321) (1.331) (1.510) (1.330) (1.351) 
Asset Level 3i,t-1 0.36** 0.36** 0.36** 0.35** 0.36** 
 (2.250) (2.262) (1.968) (2.244) (2.280) 
Asset Level 4i,t-1 0.29* 0.30* 0.40** 0.30* 0.30* 
 (1.872) (1.879) (2.236) (1.909) (1.905) 
Asset Level 5i,t-1 0.52*** 0.53*** 0.39* 0.54*** 0.54*** 
 (2.959) (3.006) (1.715) (3.014) (3.028) 
Asset Level 6i,t-1 0.39** 0.39** 0.31* 0.40** 0.40** 
 (2.498) (2.509) (1.753) (2.555) (2.530) 
Asset Level 7i,t-1 0.63*** 0.60*** 0.54** 0.60*** 0.60*** 
 (3.055) (2.880) (2.347) (2.882) (2.883) 
Asset Level 8i,t-1 0.55** 0.53** 0.51* 0.50* 0.52** 
 (2.290) (2.081) (1.696) (1.942) (2.028) 
Yeart Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 4.09*** 4.05*** 3.92*** 4.02*** 4.04*** 
 (10.297) (9.923) (8.998) (9.933) (9.925) 
No. of Observations 900 900 573 900 900 
No. of BHCs 197 197 181 197 197 
R-Squared 0.137 0.140 0.169 0.150 0.141 
Note: The table reports the results of regressions of bank insolvency risk on securitisation variables. The dependent variable is a logarithm of the z-
score measuring a bank's distance to default. Securitisation variables include: (i) retained interests; (ii) credit enhancements; (iii) credit-enhancing 
interest-only strips; (iv) subordinated securities; (v) standby letters of credit; (vi) liquidity provisions; (vii) seller’s interest; (viii) interaction between 
credit enhancements and a high liquidity provisions dummy; (ix) interaction between liquidity provisions and a high credit enhancements dummy; (x) 
credit enhancements provided to other institutions' securitisations; (xi) liquidity provisions to other institutions' securitisations; and (xii) outstanding 
securitisation. The balance sheet and income statement control variables include: (i) liquidity ratio; (ii) loan concentration; (iii) trading asset ratio; (iv) 
capital ratio; (v) revenue concentration; (vi) asset growth; and (vii) asset level dummies. Definition and construction of the variables are reported in 
Appendix A. All bank-specific variables are winsorised at the 1% level. Random effects regressions are run for the full sample of BHCs covering the 
period from 2002 to 2007, with exemption of Model 3 where the regression is run for 2004-2007. Year dummies are incorporated in all regressions. 
The t-statistics calculated using standard errors clustered at the BHC-level are reported in parentheses. *, **,*** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4 Retained Interests and Z-Score Components 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  Capital Ratio ROA ROA 
 
   
log(Credit Enhancement Ratioi,t-1) 0.06 -0.06 0.06** 
 (0.251) (-1.048) (2.242) 
log(Liquidity Provision Ratioi,t-1) -0.23 0.13 0.02 
 (-1.053) (1.206) (0.185) 
log(Seller’s Interest Ratioi,t-1) -0.70 0.14** 0.07* 
 (-1.276) (2.036) (1.845) 
log(Securitisation Ratioi,t-1) 0.03** 0.01** -0.00 
 (2.196) (2.388) (-0.645) 
Liquidity Ratioi,t-1 0.04 0.00 -0.00* 
 (1.596) (0.078) (-1.834) 
Loan HHIi,t-1 -0.02 -0.00 0.00 
 (-1.221) (-0.228) (0.654) 
Trading Ratioi,t-1 0.04 -0.00 0.02* 
 (0.383) (-0.169) (1.845) 
Capital Ratioi,t-1  0.08* 0.04*** 
  (1.700) (3.798) 
Revenue HHIi,t-1 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 
 (-0.223) (0.104) (-0.221) 
Asset Growthi,t-1 -0.05 -0.01 -0.01** 
 (-0.847) (-0.857) (-2.369) 
Asset Level 2i,t-1 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (-0.369) (0.583) (-0.296) 
Asset Level 3i,t-1 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (-0.686) (0.988) (-0.447) 
Asset Level 4i,t-1 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (-0.485) (0.955) (-0.074) 
Asset Level 5i,t-1 -0.01* 0.00* -0.00 
 (-1.863) (1.867) (-0.224) 
Asset Level 6i,t-1 -0.01 0.00* -0.00 
 (-0.829) (1.755) (-0.572) 
Asset Level 7i,t-1 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 
 (-0.903) (0.756) (-0.864) 
Asset Level 8i,t-1 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 
 (-0.824) (0.231) (-1.059) 
Yeart Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.10*** 0.00 -0.00 
 (6.014) (0.485) (-0.010) 
No. of Observations 900 900 900 
No. of BHCs 197 197 197 
R-Squared 0.002 0.532 0.389 
Note: The table presents the results of regressions of z-score components: (1) capital ratio; (2) return on assets; and (3) standard 
deviation of return on assets. Securitisation variables include: (i) credit enhancements; (ii) liquidity provisions; (iii) seller’s interest; 
and (iv) outstanding securitisation. The balance sheet and income statement control variables include: (i) liquidity ratio; (ii) loan 
concentration; (iii) trading asset ratio; (iv) capital ratio; (v) revenue concentration; (vi) asset growth; and (vii) asset level dummies. 
Definition and construction of the variable are reported in Appendix A. All variables are winsorised at the 1% level. Random effects 
regressions are run for the full sample of BHCs covering the period from 2002 to 2007. Year dummies are incorporated in all 
regressions. The t-statistics calculated using standard errors clustered at the BHC-level are reported in parentheses. *, **,*** indicate 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5 Retained Interests and Bank Insolvency Risk by Level of Securitisation  
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Low Medium High 
    
log(Retained Interest Ratioi,t-1) 536.72*** 10.64 -13.59*** 
 (4.167) (0.942) (-4.153) 
log(Securitisation Ratioi,t-1) 90.87*** 6.23** 0.06 
 (2.996) (2.394) (0.166) 
Liquidity Ratioi,t-1 0.78 0.69 1.02 
 (0.880) (1.161) (1.183) 
Loan HHIi,t-1 0.51 -1.35** -0.62 
 (0.627) (-2.349) (-1.237) 
Trading Ratioi,t-1 30.65** -9.65*** -4.41** 
 (2.298) (-4.200) (-2.150) 
Capital Ratioi,t-1 -0.25 -0.23 -0.25 
 (-0.056) (-0.156) (-0.214) 
Revenue HHIi,t-1 -0.63 0.22 -0.42 
 (-0.595) (0.251) (-0.422) 
Asset Growthi,t-1 -1.51 2.45 2.74* 
 (-1.016) (1.631) (1.682) 
Asset Level 2i,t-1 0.28 0.15 -0.07 
 (0.948) (0.723) (-0.235) 
Asset Level 3i,t-1 0.23 0.32 0.35 
 (0.774) (1.376) (0.807) 
Asset Level 4i,t-1 0.49** 0.03 -0.32 
 (2.107) (0.102) (-1.262) 
Asset Level 5i,t-1 0.44 -0.03 0.80*** 
 (1.447) (-0.084) (2.594) 
Asset Level 6i,t-1 0.22 0.04 0.64** 
 (0.787) (0.147) (2.282) 
Asset Level 7i,t-1 -0.19 0.77** 0.55* 
 (-0.377) (2.526) (1.736) 
Asset Level 8i,t-1  0.15 0.75** 
  (0.426) (2.078) 
Yeart Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 3.88*** 4.46*** 4.29*** 
 (4.376) (6.943) (5.816) 
No. of Observations 305 299 296 
No. of BHCs 63 66 68 
R-Squared 0.0985 0.245 0.308 
Note: The table presents the results of regressions of the z-score by level of securitisation. Models (1)-(3) use sub-samples of 
banks with low, medium, and high level of securitisation, accordingly. The dependent variable is a logarithm of the z-score 
measuring a bank's distance to default. Securitisation variables include: (i) retained interests; and (ii) outstanding 
securitisation. The balance sheet and income statement control variables include: (i) liquidity ratio; (ii) loan concentration; (iii) 
trading asset ratio; (iv) capital ratio; (v) revenue concentration; (vi) asset growth; and (vii) asset level dummies. Definition and 
construction of the variable are reported in Appendix A. All variables are winsorised at the 1% level. Random effects 
regressions are run for the full sample period from 2002 to 2007. Year dummies are incorporated in all regressions. The t-
statistics calculated using standard errors clustered at the BHC-level are reported in parentheses. *, **,*** indicate 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6 Instrumental Variable Analysis 
 I Stage II Stage 
 log(Retained Interest Ratioi,t-1) Z-Score 
   
log(Retained Interest Ratioi,t-1)  -24.1856 
  (-3.44) 
log(Charge-OffSec Ratioi,t-1) 0.6489***  
 (3.72)  
log(Securitisation Ratioi,t-1) 0.0329*** 0.7446 
 (2.9) (1.6) 
Liquidity Ratioi,t-1 0.0019 0.8534* 
 (0.32) (1.86) 
Loan HHIi,t-1 0.0061 -0.3755 
 (1.34) (-0.97) 
Trading Ratioi,t-1 -0.0035 -5.9498 
 (-0.14) (-2.83) 
Capital Ratioi,t-1 0.0031 -0.1847 
 (0.19) (-0.16) 
Revenue HHIi,t-1 0.0053 -0.1132 
 (0.74) (-0.21) 
Asset Growthi,t-1 0.0146 1.0769 
 (0.92) (1.22) 
Asset Level 2i,t-1 -0.0002 0.206 
 (-0.17) (1.25) 
Asset Level 3i,t-1 0.0001 0.3586** 
 (0.07) (2.29) 
Asset Level 4i,t-1 0.0016 0.3219** 
 (0.95) (2.08) 
Asset Level 5i,t-1 -0.0009 0.549*** 
 (-0.7) (3.15) 
Asset Level 6i,t-1 0.0035 0.4618*** 
 (1.37) (2.85) 
Asset Level 7i,t-1 0.0023 0.6715*** 
 (1.44) (3.22) 
Asset Level 8i,t-1 0.0046 0.6474*** 
 (1.3) (2.69) 
Yeart Yes Yes 
Constant -0.0099 4.0034*** 
 (-1.88) (10.12) 
No. of Observations 900 900 
No. of BHCs 197 197 
R-Squared 0.33 0.13 
KP rk LM Statistic 8.35***  
KP rk Wald F Statistic 13.81  
Note: The table presents the results of the 2SLS estimation of the effect of retained interests on bank 
insolvency risk. The first column reports the results of the first stage, where retained interests are 
instrumented by a logarithm of net charge-offs on securitised assets as of total outstanding securitised 
assets. The second column reports the results of the second stage of the estimation. The t-statistics 
calculated using standard errors clustered at the BHC-level are reported in parentheses. *, **,*** indicate 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 7 Robustness Tests for Retained Interests and Bank Insolvency Risk 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Z-Score(2.5%) Z-Score(5%) RAROA RAROE NPL Ratio 2002-2005 2006-2007 
        
log(Credit Enhancement Ratioi,t-1) -17.66** -16.84** -165.37 -151.05*** 0.10* -16.32* -37.81*** 
 (-2.180) (-2.222) (-1.381) (-2.604) (1.841) (-1.840) (-5.135) 
log(Liquidity Provision Ratioi,t-1) 11.41 12.02 267.89 168.92 -0.04 14.52 34.77 
 (0.237) (0.262) (0.261) (0.314) (-0.378) (0.273) (0.520) 
log(Seller’s Interest Ratioi,t-1) -7.93** -7.43** -127.15*** -138.77*** 0.08** -10.71** 8.76 
 (-2.199) (-2.166) (-3.502) (-3.463) (2.504) (-2.280) (1.450) 
log(Securitisation Ratioi,t-1) 0.30 0.30 4.06 9.14* 0.00 0.22 -0.03 
 (0.716) (0.776) (0.638) (1.827) (0.016) (0.456) (-0.031) 
Liquidity Ratioi,t-1 0.84* 0.80* 5.50 -0.55 -0.00 0.87* 0.40 
 (1.829) (1.816) (0.907) (-0.107) (-0.967) (1.660) (0.579) 
Loan HHIi,t-1 -0.46 -0.44 -4.74 -3.78 -0.00 -0.50 -0.34 
 (-1.212) (-1.185) (-1.057) (-1.020) (-1.444) (-1.213) (-0.560) 
Trading Ratioi,t-1 -5.46*** -5.06*** -67.83*** -64.18*** 0.03* -7.41*** -4.92* 
 (-2.811) (-2.799) (-3.370) (-3.089) (1.778) (-3.498) (-1.892) 
Capital Ratioi,t-1 -0.50 -0.67 -10.35 -7.36 -0.00 -0.36 -0.63 
 (-0.478) (-0.660) (-1.211) (-0.875) (-0.348) (-0.343) (-0.322) 
Revenue HHIi,t-1 -0.05 -0.06 -2.97 1.91 0.00 -0.02 -0.05 
 (-0.095) (-0.116) (-0.498) (0.363) (0.757) (-0.037) (-0.059) 
Asset Growthi,t-1 0.63 0.51 13.37 0.17 -0.00 0.58 -2.68 
 (0.747) (0.626) (1.064) (0.014) (-0.519) (0.575) (-1.368) 
Asset Level 2i,t-1 0.21 0.21 3.05* 2.48 0.00 0.23* -0.28 
 (1.331) (1.324) (1.864) (1.511) (0.488) (1.647) (-0.630) 
Asset Level 3i,t-1 0.35** 0.34** 6.46*** 6.06*** 0.00 0.39** -0.32 
 (2.283) (2.260) (4.214) (4.478) (0.014) (2.531) (-1.049) 
Asset Level 4i,t-1 0.29* 0.27* 6.35*** 5.73*** 0.00 0.18 -0.04 
 (1.853) (1.789) (4.529) (3.794) (0.558) (1.029) (-0.122) 
Asset Level 5i,t-1 0.52*** 0.49*** 12.59*** 9.82*** -0.00 0.49** -0.58* 
 (3.024) (2.938) (5.315) (5.067) (-0.045) (2.433) (-1.674) 
Asset Level 6i,t-1 0.38** 0.36** 8.89*** 8.66*** -0.00 0.52*** -0.52 
 (2.499) (2.468) (4.853) (5.173) (-0.048) (3.180) (-1.615) 
Asset Level 7i,t-1 0.59*** 0.56*** 14.82*** 13.87*** 0.00 0.82*** -0.40 
 (2.890) (2.892) (5.285) (5.220) (0.755) (4.021) (-1.117) 
Asset Level 8i,t-1 0.50** 0.45* 13.97*** 12.74*** 0.00 0.89*** -0.63 
 (2.010) (1.895) (3.644) (3.789) (0.397) (3.076) (-1.370) 
Yeart Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 4.06*** 4.09*** 11.35** 10.15** 0.01*** 4.00*** 4.32*** 
 (10.270) (10.726) (2.451) (2.526) (3.264) (8.954) (6.244) 
No. of Observations 900 900 900 900 900 663 237 
No. of BHCs 197 197 197 197 197 191 126 
R-Squared 0.137 0.136 0.144 0.150 0.104 0.135 0.211 
Note: The table presents the results of robustness tests. Models (1)-(5) use different dependent variables, where Z-Score(2.5%) and Z-Score(5%) are 
z-scores winsorised at 2.5% and 5% levels, respectively; RAROA and RAROE are risk-adjusted return on assets and equity, respectively; NPL Ratio 
is a ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. Model (6) uses the z-score as the dependent variable breaking the sample period into two sub-periods: 
2002-2005 and 2006-2007. Securitisation variables include: (i) credit enhancements; (ii) liquidity provisions; (iii) seller’s interest; and (iv) 
outstanding securitisation. The balance sheet and income statement control variables include: (i) liquidity ratio; (ii) loan concentration; (iii) trading 
asset ratio; (iv) capital ratio; (v) revenue concentration; (vi) asset growth; and (vii) asset level dummies. Definition and construction of the variable 
are reported in Appendix A. All variables are winsorised at the 1% level. . Random effects regressions are run for the full sample of BHCs covering 
the period from 2002 to 2007, with exemption of model (6). Year dummies are incorporated in all regressions. The t-statistics calculated using 
standard errors clustered at the BHC-level are reported in parentheses. *, **,*** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Appendix A Bank Holding Company Data Definition and Construction 
Variable Definition Construction (FR Y-9C Data Items) 
Balance Sheet Structure   
Total Assets Total Assets BHCK2170 
Liquidity Ratio Liquid Assets/Total Assets (BHCK0081 + BHCK0395 + BHCK0397 + BHCK1754 + BHCK1773)/BHCK2170 
Loan Ratio Loans/Total Assets BHCK 2122/BHCK2170 
Trading Ratio Trading Assets/Total Assets  BHCK3545/BHCK2170 
Deposit Ratio Deposits/Total Assets (BHCK3517+ BHCK3404)/BHCK3368 
Capital Ratio Equity Capital/Total Assets  BHCK3210/BHCK2170 
Asset Growth Asset Growth Rate  
Loan Portfolio   
Real Estate Loan Ratio Real Estate Loans/Total Loans BHCK1410/(BHCK2122 + BHCK2123) 
C&I Loan Ratio Commercial and Industrial Loans/Total Loans (BHCK1763 + BHCK1764)/(BHCK2122 + BHCK2123) 
Consumer Loan Ratio Consumer Loans/Total Loans (BHCKB538 + BHCKB539 + BHCK2011)/(BHCK2122 + BHCK2123) 
Other Loan Ratio Other Loans/Total Loans (BHCK2122 + BHCK2123 - BHCK1410 - BHCK1763 - BHCK1764 - BHCKB538 - BHCKB539 - 
BHCK2011)/(BHCK2122 + BHCK2123) 
Loan HHI Loan Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (BHCK1410/(BHCK2122 + BHCK2123))^2 + ((BHCK1763 + BHCK1764)/ (BHCK2122 + 
BHCK2123))^2 + ((BHCKB538 + BHCKB539 + BHCK2011)/ (BHCK2122 + BHCK2123))^2 + 
((BHCK2122 + BHCK2123 - BHCK1410  - BHCK1763 - BHCK1764 - BHCKB538 - BHCKB539 - 
BHCK2011)/(BHCK2122 + BHCK2123))^2 
Regulatory Capital   
Tier I Leverage Ratio Tier I Leverage Ratio BHCK7204 
Tier I Risk-Based Capital Ratio Tier I Risk-Based Capital Ratio BHCK7206 
Total Risk-Based Capital Ratio Total Risk-Based Capital Ratio BHCK7205 
   
Performance   
Interest Income/NOR Interest Income/Net Operating Revenue BHCK4074/(BHCK4074 + BHCK4079) 
Revenue HHI Revenue Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (BHCK4074/(BHCK4074 + BHCK4079))^2 + (BHCK4079/(BHCK4074 + BHCK4079))^2 
Interest Margin Net Interest Income/Total Assets BHCK4074/BHCK3368 
Return on Equity (ROE) Net Income/Equity Capital BHCK4340/BHCK3519 
Return on Assets (ROA) Net Income/Total Assets BHCK4340/BHCK3368 
   
Note: Definition and construction of variables used in the study. Bank holding company data items are taken from FR Y-9C forms. 
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Appendix A Bank Holding Company Data Definition and Construction (continued) 
Variable Definition Construction (FR Y-9C Data Items) 
Risk Characteristics   
RWATA Ratio Risk-Weighted Assets/Total Assets  BHCKA223/BHCK2170 
NPL  Ratio Non-Performing Loans/Total Loans (BHCK5525 + BHCK5526 - BHCK3506 - BHCK3507)/BHCK3516 
Charge-Off Ratio Net Charge-Offs/Total Loans  (BHCK4635 - BHCK4605)/BHCK3516 
Loan Loss Provision Ratio Quarterly Provision for Loan Losses/Total Loans  BHCK4230/BHCK3516 
Loan Loss Allowance Ratio Allowance for Loan Losses/Total Loans  BHCK3123/BHCK3516 
Z-Score (Z)  Z-Score  
RAROA  Risk-Adjusted Return on Assets  ROA Standard Deviation of Return on Assets  
RAROE Risk-Adjusted Return on Equity  
Securitisation   
Securitisation Ratio Securitised Assets/Total Assets  (BHCKB705 + BHCKB706 + BHCKB707 + BHCKB708 + BHCKB709 + BHCKB710 + BHCKB711) 
/BHCK2170 
Retained Interest Ratio (Credit Enhancements + Liquidity Provision + 
Seller’s Interest)/Total Assets  
 
Retained Interest/Securitisation Ratio (Credit Enhancements + Liquidity Provision + 
Seller’s Interest)/Securitised Assets  
 
Credit Enhancement Ratio Credit Enhancements/Total Assets (BHCKB712 + BHCKB713 + BHCKB714 + BHCKB715 + BHCKB716 +    BHCKB717 + BHCKB718 + 
BHCKC393 + BHCKC394 + BHCKC395 + BHCKC396 + BHCKC397 + BHCKC398 + BHCKC399 + 
BHCKC400 + BHCKC401 + BHCKC402 +   BHCKC403 + BHCKC404 + BHCKC405 + BHCKC406)/ 
BHCK2170     
Credit Enhancement/Securitisation Ratio Credit Enhancements/Securitised Assets (BHCKB712 + BHCKB713 + BHCKB714 +  BHCKB715 + BHCKB716 +   BHCKB717 + BHCKB718 + 
BHCKC393 + BHCKC394 + BHCKC395 + BHCKC396 + BHCKC397 + BHCKC398 + BHCKC399 + 
BHCKC400 + BHCKC401 + BHCKC402 + BHCKC403 + BHCKC404 + BHCKC405 + BHCKC406)/ 
(BHCKB705 + BHCKB706 + BHCKB707 + BHCKB708 + BHCKB709 + BHCKB710 + BHCKB711) 
Credit-Enhancing Interest Only Strip Ratio Credit-Enhancing Interest-Only Strips/Total Assets (BHCKB712 + BHCKB713 + BHCKB714 + BHCKB715 + BHCKB716 +   BHCKB717 + 
BHCKB718)/BHCK2170    
Credit-Enhancing Interest Only 
Strip/Securitisation Ratio 
Credit-Enhancing Interest-Only Strips/Securitised 
Assets  
(BHCKB712 + BHCKB713 + BHCKB714 + BHCKB715 + BHCKB716 + BHCKB717 + BHCKB718)/ 
(BHCKB705 + BHCKB706 + BHCKB707 + BHCKB708 + BHCKB709 + BHCKB710 + BHCKB711) 
   
Note: Definition and construction of variables used in the study. Bank holding company data items are taken from FR Y-9C forms. 
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Appendix A Bank Holding Company Data Definition and Construction (continued) 
Variable Definition Construction (FR Y-9C Data Items) 
Subordinated Security Ratio Subordinated Securities/Total Assets (BHCKC393 + BHCKC394 + BHCKC395 + BHCKC396 + BHCKC397 +    BHCKC398 + BHCKC399)/ 
BHCK2170 
Subordinated Security/Securitisation Ratio Subordinated Securities/Securitised Assets (BHCKC393 + BHCKC394 + BHCKC395 + BHCKC396 + BHCKC397 +    BHCKC398 + BHCKC399)/ 
(BHCKB705 + BHCKB706 + BHCKB707 + BHCKB708 + BHCKB709 + BHCKB710 + BHCKB711) 
Standby Letter of Credit Ratio Standby Letters of Credit/Total Assets (BHCKC400 + BHCKC401 + BHCKC402 + BHCKC403 + BHCKC404 + BHCKC405 + BHCKC406)/ 
BHCK2170 
Standby Letter of Credit/Securitisation Ratio Standby Letters of Credit/Securitised Assets (BHCKC400 + BHCKC401 + BHCKC402 + BHCKC403 + BHCKC404 + BHCKC405 + BHCKC406)/ 
(BHCKB705 + BHCKB706 + BHCKB707 + BHCKB708 + BHCKB709 + BHCKB710 + BHCKB711) 
Liquidity Provision Ratio Liquidity Provision Commitments/Total Assets (BHCKB726 + BHCKB727 + BHCKB728 + BHCKB729 + BHCKB730 + BHCKB731 + BHCKB732)/ 
BHCK2170 
Liquidity Provision/Securitisation Ratio Liquidity Provision Commitments/Securitised 
Assets 
(BHCKB726 + BHCKB727 + BHCKB728 + BHCKB729 + BHCKB730 +    BHCKB731 + BHCKB732)/ 
(BHCKB705 + BHCKB706 + BHCKB707 + BHCKB708 + BHCKB709 + BHCKB710 + BHCKB711) 
Seller’s Interest Ratio Seller's Interest/Total Assets (BHCKB761 + BHCKB762 + BHCKB763 + BHCKB500 + BHCKB501 + BHCKB502)/BHCK2170 
Seller’s Interest/Securitisation Ratio Seller's Interest/Securitised Assets (BHCKB761 + BHCKB762 + BHCKB763 + BHCKB500 + BHCKB501 + BHCKB502)/ 
(BHCKB705 + BHCKB706 + BHCKB707 + BHCKB708 + BHCKB709 + BHCKB710 + BHCKB711) 
NPLSec Ratio Past Due Securitised Assets/Securitised Assets (BHCKB740 + BHCKB741 + BHCKB742 + BHCKB743 + BHCKB744 + BHCKB745 + BHCKB746)/ 
(BHCKB705 + BHCKB706 + BHCKB707 + BHCKB708 + BHCKB709 + BHCKB710 + BHCKB711) 
ChargeOffSec Ratio Net Charge-Offs on Securitised Assets/Securitised (BHCKB747 + BHCKB748 + BHCKB749 + BHCKB750+ BHCKB751 + BHCKB752 + BHCKB753 - 
BHCKB754 - BHCKB755 - BHCKB756 - BHCKB757 - BHCKB758 - BHCKB759 - BHCKB760)/ 
(BHCKB705 + BHCKB706 + BHCKB707 + BHCKB708 + BHCKB709 + BHCKB710 + BHCKB711) 
Third-Party Credit Enhancement Ratio Credit Enhancements to Other Institutions' 
Securitisations/Total Assets 
(BHCKB776+ BHCKB777+ BHCKB778 + BHCKB779 + BHCKB780 + BHCKB781 + BHCKB782)/ 
BHCK2170 
Third-Party Liquidity Provision Ratio Liquidity Provision Commitments to Other 
Institutions' Securitisations/Total Assets 
(BHCKB783 + BHCKB784+ BHCKB785+ BHCKB786+ BHCKB787+ BHCKB788 + BHCKB789)/ 
BHCK2170 
Note: Definition and construction of variables used in the study. Bank holding company data items are taken from FR Y-9C forms. 
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Appendix B Correlation Matrix 
  Z-Score Securitisation 
Ratio 
Retained Interest 
Ratio 
Credit 
Enhancement 
Ratio 
Liquidity 
Provision Ratio 
Seller’s Interest 
Ratio 
Third-Party 
Credit 
Enhancement 
Ratio 
Third-Party 
Liquidity 
Provision Ratio 
         
Z-Score 1        
Securitisation Ratio -0.0917* 1       
Retained Interest Ratio -0.1775* 0.4920* 1      
Credit Enhancement Ratio -0.1592* 0.3976* 0.7652* 1     
Liquidity Provision Ratio 0.0419 0.026 0.1846* 0.0571* 1    
Seller’s Interest Ratio -0.1347* 0.4412* 0.8112* 0.3262* 0.008 1   
Third-Party Credit Enhancement Ratio -0.0012 -0.025 0.017 -0.020 0.007 0.037 1  
Third-Party Liquidity Provision Ratio -0.0301 0.012 0.2071* 0.042 0.1740* 0.2345* 0.4467* 1 
Liquidity Ratio 0.0937* -0.0975* -0.030 0.0659* 0.033 -0.1080* -0.018 0.045 
Loan HHI -0.0867* 0.1745* 0.0710* 0.0830* 0.008 0.030 -0.1173* -0.0964* 
Trading Ratio -0.1626* 0.2219* 0.1739* 0.1107* 0.1303* 0.1455* 0.2075* 0.1363* 
Capital Ratio -0.0822* 0.0930* 0.1657* 0.1586* -0.031 0.1480* -0.027 -0.041 
Revenue HHI -0.0107 -0.1947* -0.1646* -0.1043* -0.1133* -0.1311* -0.0889* -0.0895* 
Asset Growth -0.0203 0.1104* 0.1192* 0.0607* 0.039 0.1286* -0.049 -0.038 
Asset Level 2 0.0271 -0.048 -0.1006* -0.0825* -0.052 -0.0710* -0.0566* -0.051 
Asset Level 3 0.0209 -0.0942* -0.0888* -0.0596* -0.052 -0.0715* -0.026 -0.051 
Asset Level 4 -0.0307 -0.051 0.018 0.033 -0.023 0.009 -0.0566* -0.051 
Asset Level 5 0.0207 -0.0635* -0.0679* -0.021 -0.052 -0.0712* -0.0569* -0.051 
Asset Level 6 -0.0082 0.003 0.1058* 0.1103* -0.052 0.049 -0.0566* 0.1056* 
Asset Level 7 0.0947* 0.1242* 0.046 0.038 0.006 0.026 0.004 -0.051 
Asset Level 8 -0.0576* 0.2125* 0.1975* 0.0825* 0.2757* 0.2021* 0.2471* 0.2014* 
Charge-OffSec -0.1188* 0.1694* 0.5189* 0.2809* 0.0583* 0.5427* 0.0079 0.2030* 
Note: The table reports pairwise correlations between the main regression variables. * indicates significance at 10%. For the definition and construction of the variables see Appendix A. 
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Appendix B Correlation Matrix (continued) 
  Liquidity 
Ratio 
Loan 
HHI 
Trading 
Ratio 
Capital 
Ratio 
Revenue 
HHI 
Asset 
Growth 
Asset 
Level 2 
Asset 
Level 3 
Asset 
Level 4 
Asset 
Level 5 
Asset 
Level 6 
Asset 
Level 7 
Asset 
Level 8 
              
Liquidity Ratio 1             
Loan HHI 0.0763* 1            
Trading Ratio -0.1689* -0.1513* 1           
Capital Ratio 0.1180* -0.1083* -0.0827* 1          
Revenue HHI 0.1397* 0.2816* -0.1998* 0.1407* 1         
Asset Growth -0.0919* 0.1235* 0.0669* -0.038 -0.003 1        
Asset Level 2 0.0813* 0.1063* -0.1171* -0.042 0.2238* -0.029 1       
Asset Level 3 0.1510* 0.1250* -0.1177* -0.048 0.0880* -0.0948* -0.1429* 1      
Asset Level 4 -0.0718* -0.0748* -0.1163* 0.2029* 0.027 -0.014 -0.1421* -0.1429* 1     
Asset Level 5 -0.0565* 0.1343* -0.1099* -0.0601* -0.0664* 0.0591* -0.1429* -0.1436* -0.1429* 1    
Asset Level 6 0.0729* -0.020 -0.048 0.041 -0.0665* 0.0613* -0.1421* -0.1429* -0.1421* -0.1429* 1   
Asset Level 7 -0.025 -0.0920* 0.038 -0.0636* -0.1035* 0.006 -0.1429* -0.1436* -0.1429* -0.1436* -0.1429* 1  
Asset Level 8 -0.1773* -0.2544* 0.5887* -0.0659* -0.3508* 0.047 -0.1421* -0.1429* -0.1421* -0.1429* -0.1421* -0.1429* 1 
Charge-OffSec Ratio -0.1465* -0.1158* 0.1682* 0.0957* -0.2061* -0.0139 -0.1208* -0.1214* -0.0499 0.046 0.1115* 0.0125 0.2442* 
Note: The table reports pairwise correlations between the main regression variables. * indicates significance at 10%. For the definition and construction of the variables see Appendix A. 
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Appendix C Hausman Specification Test for Retained Interests and Bank Insolvency 
Risk  
  Coefficients  Difference SE 
  FE RE     
  (b) (B) (b-B) SqRt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
log(Retained Interest Ratioi,t-1) -9.3057 -12.6749 3.3692 3.4380 
log(Securitisation Ratioi,t-1) 1.1558 0.2855 0.8703 0.4633 
Liquidity Ratioi,t-1 1.1164 0.8676 0.2488 0.8019 
Loan HHIi,t-1 0.2400 -0.4451 0.6851 0.7085 
Trading Ratioi,t-1 0.9914 -5.9511 6.9425 4.3639 
Capital Ratioi,t-1 3.8240 -0.4070 4.2310 1.8568 
Revenue HHIi,t-1 -0.2821 -0.1299 -0.1522 0.6660 
Asset Growthi,t-1 1.0289 0.8782 0.1507 0.5007 
Asset Level 2i,t-1 -0.0357 0.2149 -0.2506 0.1921 
Asset Level 3i,t-1 0.0318 0.3552 -0.3235 0.2511 
Asset Level 4i,t-1 -0.0647 0.2938 -0.3585 0.3278 
Asset Level 5i,t-1 0.2056 0.5185 -0.3128 0.4424 
Asset Level 6i,t-1 -0.1566 0.3911 -0.5476 0.5011 
Asset Level 7i,t-1 -0.3658 0.6266 -0.9923 0.5821 
Asset Level 8i,t-1 -0.8306 0.5542 -1.3848 0.6948 
Year 2 -0.1225 -0.1014 -0.0211 0.0212 
Year 3 0.0354 0.0341 0.0013 0.0439 
Year 4 0.1776 0.1395 0.0381 0.0484 
Year 5 -0.0138 -0.0993 0.0855 0.0631 
Year 6 -0.6511 -0.7169 0.0659 0.0749 
  
b = Consistent under Ho and Ha 
B = Inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho 
Test:  Ho:  Difference in coefficients not systematic 
chi2(20) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
chi2(20) = 26.70 
Prob>chi2 = 0.1439 
Note: The table report the results of the Hausman specification test for the regression of bank insolvency risk (equation (1)). 
Hausman specification test compares fixed effects versus random effects estimates; under the null hypothesis, the individual 
effects are uncorrelated with the other regressors in the model and can be treated as random (see Hausman (1978)). The 
statistically insignificant difference (H0 is not rejected) is interpreted as evidence for applying the random effects model.  
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